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TAXING SPECULATIVE LAND GAINS:
THE VERMONT EXPERIENCE*
R LISLE BAKER **
STEPHEN O. ANDERSEN***
I. INTRODUCTION
Proponents of land conservation have become increasingly con-
cerned about escalating land prices and the rapid conversion of open
space for more intensive land use. This concern has caused a re-
newed interest in taxation as a technique of land use control.'
Since 1973, Vermont has used taxation for land use control by im-
posing a stiff graduated tax2 on capital gain realized from certain
* Copyright 1982 R. L. Baker.
** Professor of Law, Suffolk University Law School, Boston, Massachusetts.
Professor of Economics, The College of the Atlantic, Bar Harbor, Maine.
1. See generally, D. HAGMAN AND D. MISCYNSKI, WINDFALLS FOR WIPEOUTS:
LAND VALUE CAPTURE AND COMPENSATION (1978); LINCOLN INSTITUTE OF LAND
POLICY, TAX POLICIES TO ACHIEVE LAND USE GOALS (Lefcoe and Woolery eds.
1978); Currier, Exploring the Role of Taxation in the Land Use Planning Process, 51
IND. L.J. 45 (1975); Delogu, The Taxing Power as a Land Use Control Device, 45 DEN.
L.J. 279 (1968); Gurko, Federal Income Taxes and Urban Sprawl, 48 DEN. L. J. 329
(1972); Zimmerman, Tax Planning for Land Use Control, 5 URB. LAW. 639 (1973).
Conservationists (aided by tax counsel) can use the taxing power to preserve open
space and valuable land for future generations. For a series of case studies of three
such efforts, see BERGIN, PARTIAL DEVELOPMENT FINANCES OPEN SPACE PRESERVA-
TION IN LINCOLN, MASSACHUSETTS; CHERINGTON, BARGAIN PURCHASE OF LAND BY
AN EXEMPT ORGANIZATION: A VERMONT CASE STUDY; EMORY, CONSERVATION
EASEMENTS PRESERVE AN ISLAND ON THE MAINE COAST (Browne ed.), available
from the New England Natural Resources Center, Boston, Massachusetts.
2. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, §§ 10001-10 (1973).
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short-term3 , high-profit sales4 of Vermont land. Known as the land
gains tax, its rate varies depending upon two factors: the transferor's
gain as a percentage of basis and the amount of time the transferor
has held the land prior to sale. The Vermont tax does not apply to
land held for more than six years, small primary homesites, or gain
derived from structures on the land.
This article summarizes a much lengthier, two-volume reports on
3. The statute only taxes profits on land that the owner acquires and then sells
within six years. Id. at § 10003. For a review of the full tax schedule, see note 37 and
accompanying text infra.
4. The Vermont legislature specifically placed the legal burden of complying with
the statute on the seller because it sought to regulate the seller's behavior in the land
market. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 10006 (1973). The seller, however, may try to avoid
the economic impact of the tax by shifting the burden to the buyer in the form of
higher sales costs, but with uncertain results. For further discussion of the land gains
tax burden, see notes 39-73 and accompanying text infra.
5. To evaluate Vermont's experience in taxing speculative land gains, the Na-
tional Science Foundation awarded a grant in 1976 to the Environmental Law Insti-
tute. The Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, Cambridge, Massachusetts, provided
supplementary assistance in 1979. This article summarizes the report of that analysis,
Taxing Speculative Land Gains: The Vermont Experience. Interested readers may
obtain the full, two-volume report from the Environmental Law Institute, 1346 Con-
necticut Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036. The authors developed much of the
study from the theoretical and analytic foundation published in Baker, Controlling
Land Uses and Prices by Using Special Gain Taxation to Intervene in the Land Market."
The Vermont Experiment, 4 ENVTL AFF. 427 (1975).
The authors based their study on the results of several research methodologies.
First, Vermont residents, attorneys, legislators, and other public officials evaluated the
land gains tax in comprehensive interviews. Second, the Vermont Department of
Taxes provided a sample of 1,000 land gains tax returns correlated to taxpayer income
where possible but with protections for taxpayer identity. Third, over 600 purchasers
or subdividers of Vermont land from 1968-78 participated in a nationwide telephone
survey. Fourth, the study compared open land prices in three sets of Vermont and
New Hamphire towns. Finally, the authors did conventional library research. Their
report, conclusions, and recommendations are their own, and do not necessarily rep-
resent the opinions of the sponsoring agencies.
This report was a collective enterprise. Professor Baker was Principal Investigator
and primary author of the introduction, tax administration, law, and conclusion sec-
tions of the main report. Dr. Andersen was primarily responsible for drafting the
analysis of the land gains tax as a revenue-raising device, and evaluating the impact
of the tax on land prices. In collaboration with the authors, Dr. Floyd J. Fowler,
director of the Center for Survey Research, Boston, Massachusetts, prepared the sur-
vey section of the full report. All three have worked to condense much of that discus-
son into this article.
The authors summarize in the full report the advice and supervision of others who
made extemely valuable contributions that benefited the study. Those deserving of
special mention here include: Dr. Richard Liroff, now with the Conservation Foun-
dation, who conducted many personal interviews; Jonathon Brownell and John Ew-
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the land gains tax in an effort to provide a greater understanding of
certain issues involved with the law, especially for legislators who be-
lieve their states might benefit from such a measure.6 The authors
discuss four major aspects of the Vermont experience: (1) the back-
ground of the tax;7 (2) how Vermont administers the law;'
(3) whether the tax accomplished its goals;9 and (4) its constitutional
and legal implications.' 0
II. BACKGROUND OF THE VERMONT LAND GAINS TAX
A. Origin of the Land Gains Tax
Vermont's population of less than 500,000 is scattered throughout
small towns and an unusually scenic countryside that Vermont citi-
zens, and more recently, out-of-state visitors have come to appreciate.
Fearing that land speculators and developers might disrupt Ver-
mont's character by rapidly converting open space to more intensive
uses, Vermont passed two laws designed to stem such uncontrolled
development. In the early 1970's, the legislature passed a statewide
development permit system called Act 250.1' In 1973, Vermont
ing of the Vermont Bar, who provided helpful background information on their
state's land market; Robert Lathrop, formerly Vermont's Tax Commissioner, and
Henry Ferry, who headed Lathrop's Land Gains Tax Division; Kingsbury Browne,
who practices federal tax law in Boston; Professor Oliver Oldman of the Harvard Law
School; and Barbara Searles who prepared much field data. The authors acknowl-
edge in the full report numerous other professionals, including Professor Daniel
Mandelker of the Washington University School of Law, and are grateful for their
assistance, Finally, many students at Williams College, Suffolk University, and the
College of the Atlantic provided invaluable assistance to the authors.
6. The Vermont law has generated much interest in other states. Legislators in
Hawaii, Maine, Massachusetts, Montana, and Washington have proposed similar
taxes. Washington, D.C. has enacted a housing speculation tax that one might con-
sider an urban version of the Vermont land gains tax. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 47-
3301 et. seq. (Supp. 1980).
England and New Zealand have also enacted laws similar to Vermont's. For a
discussion of land speculation taxes in other countries, see D. HAGMAN & D. Mis-
CZYNSKI, WINDFALLS FOR WIPEOUTS: LAND VALUE CAPTURE AND COMPENSATION
437-69 (1978).
7. See notes 11-23 and accompanying text infra.
8. See notes 24-73 and accompanying text infra.
9. See notes 74-82 and accompanying text infra.
10. See notes 83-144 and accompanying text infra.
11. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 6001 et. seq. (1970), amended, 1979. While Vermont
heavily regulates private land development, Act 250 is the most significant land use
control. It requires an owner to obtain a permit for any proposed subdivision or
19811
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passed the land gains tax12 in response to the apparent public support
for the law as reflected in the successful election campaign of Gover-
nor Thomas Salmon, who advocated increasing state property tax re-
lief with revenue generated from a transfer tax on speculative land
sales. While no scientific polls of the attitudes of Vermont citizens
concerning the tax are available, informal surveys reflect popular
support for the land gains tax, though the latest poll is now five years
old. 3 At the same time, the Vermont Association of Realtors and
other members of the Vermont real estate community have consist-
ently lobbied to reduce the impact of the tax. These lobbying efforts
have had some success by achieving three amendments to the
development likely to have a significant environmental impact or if the land is located
in a Vermont town that has no local zoning or subdivision control. Id. For a further
discussion of the permit process and land use plan, see F. BOSSELMAN AND D. CAL-
LIES, THE QUIET REVOLUTION IN LAND USE CONTROL 54-108 (1971); HEALY, et al.,
LAND USE AND THE STATES (2d ed. 1979); MYERS, So GoES VERMONT (1974); Wal-
ter, 2he Law of the Land: Development Regulation in Maine and Vermont, 23 ME. L.
REv. 315 (1971).
Vermont also employs virtually .ll known forms of taxation for raising necessary
revenue. Those levies that most directly affect the land market are the state personal
and corporate income taxes, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, §§ 5811 et. seq. (Supp. 1980); the
local property tax that each town assesses and collects, id. at §§ 3401 et. seq.; and the
small property transfer tax that the state applies to virtually every transfer of real
property, id. at §§ 9601 et. seq.
Vermont also administers a program that lessens the impact of property taxes on
open space, id. at §§ 3751 et. seq. For further discussions of open space tax exemp-
tions, see generaloy COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, UNTAXING OPEN SPACE
(1976); Currier, Ahn Analysis of Dffierential Taxation as a Method of Maintaining Agri-
cultural and Open Space Uses, 30 FLA. L. REV. 821 (1978); Keene, DifferentialAssess-
ment and the Preservation of Open Space, 14 URBAN L. ANN. 11 (1977); Malone and
Ayesh, Comprehensive Land Use Control Through Differential Assessment and Supple-
mental Regulation, 18 WASHBURN Li. 432 (1979); Roberts, The Big Giveaway Called
DierentialAssessment: Some Thoughts on the Integration of Tax and Land Use Pol-
icy, 2 UPB. L. & POL'Y 65 (1979).
12. The land gains tax became effective in May, 1973. The Vermont legislature
has subsequently amended the law three times. A modification in 1974 expanded the
exemption for sales of primary and residential homesites from one to five acres. In
1976, Vermont extended the primary homesite exemption to transactions involving a
purchaser who promises to build a primary residence on the parcel. A third amend-
ment in 1978 increased the primary homesite exemption from five to ten acres and
also eliminated the requirement that the parties to a transaction file certain certifica-
tions. For a further discussion of the primary homesite exemption, see notes 61-62
and accompanying text infra.
13. During the mid-1970's a Vermont state senator informally polled constituents
[Vol. 22:3
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statute. ' 4
B. Purposes of the Tax
The Vermont land gains tax has two primary purposes. The main
goal is to deter landowners from transferring (by sale or other ex-
change) land held for a short period of time, where the principal eco-
nomic return realized comes from increased value rather than rental
or other income."5 The other chief reason for the tax is to generate
revenue for the state's property tax relief program. 6 Vermont recog-
nized the difficulty of accomplishing both objectives at the same time.
A fully effective regulatory tax dissuades people from undertaking
the taxable conduct, costing the state tax revenue it would otherwise
collect. The legislature, however, apparently believed Vermont
would benefit from a law that accomplished either goal. 7
Two secondary regulatory consequences may result if a land gains
tax successfully deters speculation in land in which the purchaser an-
ticipates a short holding period. First, the tax may reduce the rate of
subdivision of productive agricultural and other lands into recrea-
participating in statewide town meeting day on a variety of public issues. Citizens
responded favorably when asked specifically about the land gains tax:
1974: Do you support the Vermont Capital Gains Tax on Land Sales?
Yes: 50% No: 28% Undecided: 22%
(based on approximately 7,000 returns from Vermont's 14 counties).
1977: Should the Vermont gains tax on short-term sale (six years or less, nonresi-
dential) be repealed?
Yes: 2,159 No: 5,058 Undecided: 1,161
Public opinion questionnaires prepared by Sen. William Doyle, Washington
County, Vermont. (March, 1974, and March, 1977).
14. See note 12 supra.
15. The Vermont Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the land gains
tax in Andrews v. Lathrop, 132 Vt. 256, 315 A.2d 860 (Vt. 1974). The court held that
the legislature may lawfully enact such a tax as a means to deter land speculation.
While the law treats taxpayers differently depending upon the amount of gain they
realize on a land sale, the court held that the state's legitimate interest in deterring
land speculation justified the tax. Id. at 256, 315 A.2d at 863. For a further discus-
sion of the legal issues involved in the land gains tax, see notes 83-144 and accompa-
nying text infra.
16. The legislature furthered two important tax policies by creating this new
source of revenue. First, the state uses the additional income it derives from the land
gains tax to ease the property tax burden on poorer landowners. Second, the law
allows the state to collect revenue from nonresidents who realize a gain on land sales
in Vermont. The tax has not, however, produced a revenue windfall for the state.
See section IV-B infra.
17. See generally notes 74-82 and accompanying text infra.
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tional second home lots. Arguably, one way of achieving swift land
value appreciation is to divide a large economy-size land parcel into
smaller ones that individuals can afford. 8 Thus, to the extent that
subdivision requires a quick sale to be profitable,' 9 the land gains tax
should cause the incidence of subdivision to abate-at least as long as
the subdivision does not involve primary homesites that are exempt
from land gains taxation.20 Second, if the land gains tax induces a
reduction of speculation, it may lessen the rapid escalation of land
prices, though the effect of speculation on land prices is an un-
resolved issue.
Advocates of an unrestricted development market attribute rising
land prices to the demands of increasing populations and incomes.
They contend that speculators merely help the market function prop-
erly by bringing together present sellers with future buyers, or by
opening up old land areas to new demand, with a rate of return justi-
fied by the risks involved.2'
18. TASK FORCE ON LAND USE AND URBAN GROWTH, CITIZENS' ADVISORY
COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, THE USE OF LAND: A CITIZENS GUIDE
TO URBAN GROWTH 264 (1973) [hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE].
Vermont has focused the regulatory impact of the land gains tax on these second-
home lot developments. The state exempts from taxation transfers of primary
homesite property. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 10002(b) (1973). See also notes 61-62
and accompanying text infra.
19. Vermont assesses the land gains tax on transfers of land the owner has held
for six years or less. See note 37 and accompanying text infra.
20. Thus, to the extent that more Vermont open space remains in unbroken par-
cels until it is ripe for development, planners may better develop a land plan that
successfully integrates the parcel with subsequent construction. Without such plan-
ning, a poorly designed subdivision may do more than environmental harm than ugly
buildings that developers construct on it. In other words:
If past experience is any guide, many of the lots now being created will never be
used at all: in this case, it is, "lots first, buildings never." The lot lines will re-
main on the record books, though, and land titles will become even more clouded
as decades pass. Tough for the land buyers? Yes. Tough also for the environ-
ment as is shown by any number of "dead subdivisions" created forty or fifty
years ago. If a few scattered lots are built upon, the subdivison may become a
sparsely settled rural slum. . . . Once the countryside has been given over to
quarter acre or I-acre lots (and most recreational lots sold in 1971 were one-
quarter to 1-acre in size), you can forget thoughts of clustering, variable densities,
common open spaces, and the like. . . . The lot lines will survive to block sensi-
tive use of the land.
TASK FORCE, supra note 18, at 275-76. For additional discussion of the environmen-
tal problems of poor land planning, see I. MCHARG, DEsIGN WITH NATURE (1969);
Toner and Thurow, Let Nature Decide the Land Use, 40 PLAN. 17 (Jan. 1974).
21. One author has argued that speculators play an important role in any land
[Vol. 22:3
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Proponents of government intervention to control land speculation
take a different view of the impact of speculation on land prices.
They argue that speculators artificially increase land prices in differ-
ent (and sometimes inconsistent) ways: (1) by withholding some
land from resale, awaiting even higher prices; (2) by bidding up the
prices of land they do not yet own; or (3) by short-term holding of
other land, fostering an accelerating turnover of properties that am-
plifies the cost-push inflation of significant land transfer expenses.
Arguably, these price increases cause higher tax assessments for land-
owners reluctant to sell.
While this study does not attempt to resolve this theoretical dispute
underlying the impact of land speculation upon land prices, it does
attempt to assess the impact of the land gains tax on land prices. One
can hypothesize that the impact of the land gains tax on land prices
depends upon the interaction of two factors. First, how much land
did owners withhold from the active real estate market in order to
avoid paying the gains tax? Second, how much land was not
purchased by prospective buyers who decided not to enter the Ver-
mont land market because of the tax deterrent? All things being
equal, if the first factor exceeds the second, land prices will increase.
Conversely, if the second factor exceeds the first, land prices will de-
crease. One can hypothesize even further that the absolute amount of
land transferred will probably decline because the tax discourages
both buyers and sellers from entering the land market.22
To the extent that the introduction of the land gains tax diminishes
land transfers, a real income loss will occur to those intermediaries in
the land market, such as brokers, bankers, and attorneys, whose live-
market system, acting as insurers who assume the risk of volatile land prices. See L.
ROSE, TAXATION OF LAND VALUE INCREMENTS ATTRIBUTABLE TO REZONING 42
(1971). Others say speculators properly act as "land bankers," acquiring property in
advance of need and later releasing it during periods of high demand. See Elias and
Gillies, Some Observations on the Role of Speculators and Speculation in Land Devel-
opment, 12 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 789 (1965). Others argue either that short-term specula-
tion serves no banking function, or that it is inherently inflationary. See ONTARIO
MINISTRY OF ECONOMICS AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, THE LAND SPECU-
LATION TAX (1974); Note, State Taxation--Use of Taxing Power to Achieve Environ-
mental Goals: Vermont Taxes Gains Realizedfrom the Sale or Exchange of Land Held
Less than Six Years-Vermont Statute Ann tit. 32 §§ 10001-10 (1973), 49 WASH. L.
REV. 1159, 1163 (1974).
22. For a more elaborate theoretical analysis of these land market issues, see
Baker, Controlling Land Uses and Prices by Using Special Gain Taxation to Intervene
in the Land Market: The Vermont Experiment, 4 ENVTL AFF. 427 (1975).
1981]
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lihood depends upon an active and high value land market. Slower
land turnover and smaller price increases will also diminish state rev-
enues from transfer taxes. At the same time, to the extent that the
land gains tax produces a general reduction in the land prices of de-
velopable land, it may facilitate the entry of low and moderate in-
come individuals into the land market. Lower prices may, however,
produce a loss in appreciation income to the landowners from whom
such individuals would buy. In other words, price inflation is a po-
tential benefit for current landowners but a burden on those who
would become landowners in a more open market.
2 3
In summary, the land gains tax had two primary purposes: to raise
revenue and to regulate speculation in Vermont land. Within the
regulatory purpose of deterring speculation, one can hypothesize two
possible regulatory consequences: controlling subdivision and con-
trolling land prices. The remainder of this article examines two ques-
tions of particular importance to those considering enacting a land
gains tax. First, how did Vermont design the statute to accomplish
these purposes? Second, did the tax accomplish these goals and hy-
pothesized secondary impacts?
III. TAX ADMINISTRATION AND STATUTORY DESIGN
We have examined the conditions that prompted Vermont to enact
its land gains tax, and the purposes the state hoped to achieve
through the law. We now review the operation of the statute. This
section describes how the tax due is computed, analyzes the chief
components of the problems of tax formula, and summarizes the tax
collection process.24
A. Computing the Tax
The Vermont land gains tax is a stiff, graduated tax on capital gain
realized from the transfer of Vermont land26 held six years or less.2 7
A land sale is usually a relatively straightforward transaction, and
23. Id.
24. The authors gathered the information in this section from interviews with offi-
cials of the Vermont Tax Department and 15 Vermont attorneys specializing in real
estate.
25. For an example of how Vermont calculates taxable gain, see note 37 and ac-
companying text i.fra.
26. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 10002(a) (1973).
27. See note 37 infra.
(Vol. 22:3
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Vermont applies its land gains tax accordingly. 28
The authors of the tax borrowed heavily from the terminology of
federal tax law. These elements have effectively the same meaning
for land gains tax purposes as for federal tax purposes, and comprise
the basic formula the state uses to compute the tax due on a land
transaction.29 First, the state determines the basis, or adjusted cost of
purchase of the property.3" Second, the state computes the taxable
gain that the owner realizes at the time of sale or exchange3 by sub-
tracting the basis from the sale or exchange price.3 2 Third, the state
uses a graduated schedule to determine the tax rate on the gain; the
tax burden is heaviest on owners who hold property for short periods
of time, and whose gain as a percentage of basis is high.3 3
Vermont does not always realize revenue from land transfers that
are subject to this computation. As discussed previously,34 Vermont
will sacrifice tax receipts as a matter of public policy to achieve its
regulatory goal of deterring the taxable event--quick land sales.
Two important exemptions from the land gains tax complement this
regulatory objective. First, Vermont only taxes the gain allocable to
land that is sold or exchanged, exempting gain allocable to structures
28. The authors of the law also intended the tax to apply against more complex
types of sales. The "option grant" is one such transfer mechanism. An option is a
land transaction that delays transfer of possession; for a price, the owner instead
grants a purchase option to a potential buyer. The buyer then has additional time to
investigate the availability of financing, permits, and other matters, and to more care-
fully evaluate the basic purchase decision. While the buyer ponders, the seller may
not solicit other purchasers until the option period ends. While the seller does not
transfer possession of the property during this period, he or she is liable under the
land gains tax. Vermont treats the granting of an option as a taxable event, just like a
normal sale or exchange of land.
29. Vermont drew from federal tax law many terms within the land gains tax,
benefitting land gains taxpayers and tax attorneys, especially nonresidents who are
already familiar with the language and rules attendant to computing gain taxable
under federal law.
30. The statute incorporates by reference the definition of basis in the Internal
Revenue Code. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 10005(a) (1973). Basis is the buyer's tax cost
for acquiring the property, but basis may increase or decrease during the subsequent
holding period. Adjustments in basis ultimately affect the owner's land gains tax lia-
bility at resale. See notes 39-43 and accompanying text infra.
31. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, §§ 10005(b), (d) (1973).
32, Id. § 10005(c).
33. See note 37 infra.
34. See generally notes 11-23 and accompanying text supra.
1981)
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on the parcel.35 Second, Vermont exempts a property transfer from
land gains taxation up to an acreage limit if the land is a primary
homesite.36 It is immaterial whether the site is the seller's or the
buyer's principal residence, or whether the owner sells the lot to a
builder of a principal residence.
A simple example illustrates the land gains tax in operation. A
subdivider buys a 100-acre parcel of property for $200,000; this
purchase price is the buyer's basis. Eight months later, the subdivider
sells lots without structures for $350,000 to buyers who will not build
their principal homes there. The subdivider has realized a gain of
$150,000 during the holding period, and the state calculates the tax
due from the following schedule:
Years Land Held By Gain, as a Percentage of Basis3 7 (Tax Cost)
Transferor
0-99% 100-199% 200% or more
Less than I year 30% 45% 60%
1 year, but less than 2 25% 37.5% 50%
2 years, but less than 3 20% 30% 40%
3 years, but less than 4 15% 22.5% 30%
4 years, but less than 5 10% 15% 20%
5 years, but less than 6 5% 7.5% 10%
Thus, this seller would pay a thirty percent tax on the $150,000 gain
realized, or $45,000. The remaining $105,000 would also be subject
to federal income or federal capital gains taxation.
The schedule reflects one purpose of the tax-deterring quick land
sales and exchanges.38 The tax on reduced gains decreases for each
year the owner holds the property. In the above example, the seller
could have eliminated tax liability by holding the property for six
years, rather than eight months, before selling it.
Often the land gains tax does not operate as easily as it did in the
35. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 10002(a) (1973). See also notes 53-59 and accompa-
nying text infra.
36. Id. at § 10002(b) (1973). See also notes 61-62 and accompanying text infra.
37. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 10003 (1973). This report accepted the interpretation
of the Vermont Department of Taxes that the tax schedule is flat, not graduated. For
example, the Department contended that the statute taxes a six-month 300% gain at a
60% rate. In Langrock v. Dea't of Taxes, 139 Vt. 108, 423 A.2d 838 (1980), the
Vermont Supreme Court rejected the Department's interpretation. The court held
that the state must apply the tax on a graduated scale. In our example, the tax would
be 30% on the first 100% of gain, 45% on the second 100%, and 60% on the remainder.
Id. at 110, A.2d at 839.
38. See notes 15-17 and accompanying text supra.
[Vol. 22:3
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example. The computation becomes more difficult if the seller can
adjust the basis, modify the gain, or take advantage of the exemp-
tions. Thus, the components of the land gains tax deserve careful
scrutiny.
B. The Components of the Tax Formula and Problems
of Statutory Design
1. Calculation of Basis
Basis is the first key determinant of an owner's liability for a taxa-
ble land transfer; it is the "base line" from which the state measures
any taxable gain.39 The original basis, the price that the owner paid,
can be adjusted during the subsequent holding period. If the owner
sells the property within the taxable holding period he or she will
benefit from an increased basis because the statute determines the
ultimate tax liability by subtracting the basis from the sale or ex-
change price. Thus, the higher the basis, the less taxable gain the
seller realizes.
One way the original basis can be adjusted upward is through im-
provements in the land.' For example, if a developer buys a parcel
for $50,000 and spends $20,000 on roads, sidewalks, and sewer and
water systems, the property's new basis is $70,000. If the developer
subsequently sells the property during the taxable holding period for
$100,000, the gain subject to tax liability is $30,000 (sale price less
adjusted basis).
Basis also changes when the landowner dies and the property
passes through the estate. In that case, the basis is the value of the
land at the time of death rather than the price the decedent originally
paid.41 Thus, the estate will avoid considerable land gains tax liabil-
ity if the parcel had appreciated in value from the time the decedent
purchased the land to the time of death.
For example, a subdivider acquires a 100-acre parcel of property
for $100,000. One year later, the owner dies after subdividing the
parcel but before selling any lots. During that year the subdivided
39. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 10005(c) (1973).
40. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, Regulation No. 1. 10005(a)-i (1976). Vermont's De-
partment of Taxes promulgated a series of such interpretive regulations pursuant to
enabling authority the legislature provided in the statute. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32,
§ 10009(a) (1973).
41. Id. at § 10005(f). See also VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, Regulation No. 1. 10005(a)-
3 (1976).
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property substantially appreciated in value. The executor values the
land at $210,000 at the time of the subdivider's death and the Internal
Revenue Service accepts this finding for federal estate tax purposes.
The parcel's basis consequently has "stepped up" from the purchase
price by $110,000. Six months after the owner's death, the estate sells
the subdivided lots as a block of second homesites42 for $250,000.
Thus, the taxable gain realized after sale is not $150,000 but $40,000
(sale price less adjusted basis), and the land gains tax liability is ac-
cordingly lower.43
This seemingly favorable tax result has also produced a dilemma
for taxable estates. Executors and administrators can minimize both
federal and Vermont estate taxes by arguing for a low value on capi-
tal assets in the estate. Under-valuation, however, lowers the basis of
the property, resulting in stiff land gains tax liability if the estate dis-
poses of the property within the six-year taxable holding period.
This result seems inconsistent with the regulatory purpose of the
land gains tax. An estate has a short holding period because of the
owner's death rather than short-term speculation. Thus, the estate
should not be subject to land gains tax liability because no conduct is
deterred. Ironically, the threat of a stiff land gains tax might en-
courage estates to more realistically value property, providing the
state with an enforcement mechanism for accurately calculating es-
tate taxes. We believe the land gains tax law should allow the estate
to "tack on" the owner's pre-death holding period, and to calculate
gain from the decedent's original basis or purchase price. This would
give estate planners more flexibility, and allow Vermont to treat all
short-term property ownership the same.
2. Determining Total Taxable Gain
The second key determinant of land gains tax liability is the taxa-
ble gain the owner realizes from the sale or other transaction." Ver-
42. If the decedent had intended the property to holdprimary homesites, the es-
tate would be exempt from land gains tax liability when subsequently selling the lots.
See note 36 and accompanying text supra.
43. The statute would tax the realized gain of $40,000 at 30%. See generally note
37 supra.
44. Vermont assesses a land gains tax to transactions where the owner passes title
to property in return for consideration. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 10004(a) (1973). See
also, Harden v. Vermont Dep't of Taxes, 134 Vt. 122, 125, 352 A.2d 685, 687 (Vt.
1976) (a "taxable event" occurs when a property owner transfers or invests title to
another person, and when an optionee transfers an existing option to a third party).
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mont designed the statute to tax net sale proceeds as capital gain
instead of treating the gain as taxable income, which, if the federal
tax model were followed, would allow the deduction of uncapitalized
costs of ownership such as property taxes and mortgage interest pay-
ments. In the ordinary case, the seller cannot deduct these costs in
the Vermont scheme that taxes gain, rather than the profit realized
from ownership, unless he makes a section 266 election.45 The owner
can deduct incidental ownership costs servicing the land, such as the
price of land use permit applications, only if he or she pays others to
perform these duties. The owner cannot decrease net taxable gain if
he or she does the work.
The taxpayer cannot deduct costs of ownership, but he or she can
report other expenses that reduce net sales proceeds, resulting in re-
duced taxable gain and lower tax liability. Specifically, the law al-
lows the seller to deduct certain costs of sale.46 Vermont land gains
tax regulations provide that legal fees, surveying costs, sales commis-
sions, and other costs can reduce taxable gain "to the extent directly
related to the sale of a particular parcel. . . .,4" The Vermont De-
45. I.R.C. § 266 (West Supp. 1980). Normally, land ownership costs (as opposed
to costs associated with acquisition and sale) are not relevant for purposes of deter-
mining taxable gain. Vermont's treatment of these costs departs from federal law,
where a taxpayer may deduct such expenses from ordinary income when determining
income tax liability.
Vermont does provide an alternative means for the taxpayers to take advantage of
ownership costs to reduce land gains tax liability. A taxpayer can capitalize such
costs under the Internal Revenue Code in order to increase the basis of the property
for federal purposes. At the same time, he may capitalize these costs to increase basis
and subsequently lower his Vermont land gains tax liability. The chief of the Land
Gains Tax Division said, however, that most taxpayers do not capitalize these costs.
Thus, without such an election, the Vermont Department of Taxes disallows adjusted
increases in basis for costs such as taxes and interest payments.
46. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 10005(b) (1973).
47. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, Regulation No. 1. 10005(b)-l(a) (1976).
Two of the most important costs are broker and attorney fees. Vermont real estate
brokerage commissions range from six percent of the sale price on improved proper-
ties to 10% of the sale price of open land. The Department of Taxes will probably
accept taxpayer returns that disclose payments falling within these ranges. The De-
partment more closely scrutinizes higher reported commissions to determine if they
are accurate, or if the taxpayer inflated the figure to reduce land gains tax liability.
While the Department allows deductions for reasonable attorney fees that a tax-
payer reports as a cost of sale, the Department disallows seller's attempts to deduct
fees they allegedly paid to themselves when acting as an attorney in a land
transaction.
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partment of Taxes has closely scrutinized, and in some cases, rejected
the validity of certain costs that a seller claims are "directly related"
to sale. For example, it disallowed a developer's claim that certain
promotional expenditures were a cost of sale of individual parcels in
a large project. The developer did not appeal the ruling.4 8
The average seller should not expect to lower net taxable gain by
spending more money on costs so as to decrease net sale proceeds.
4 9
The one exception to this general rule occurs when an average seller
falls into a higher bracket because a sale resulted in an unusually
large gain. The increased costs involved in such sales would reduce
the seller's gain, and ultimately the land gains tax rate. This seller
would partially achieve the same goal50 by either lowering the sales
price or holding the property longer before selling.
3. Tax Exemptions
While the authors of the Vermont tax wrote into their statute fed-
eral tax terms such as "basis", "sale or exchange", and "gain," they
departed from this federal model when they determined which land
transactions the law would tax. Specifically, Vermont exempts from
taxation gain that is: 1) allocable to buildings or other structures on
the property,5 and 2) allocable to land that is a principal residential
homesite.52 These exemptions make administration of the tax
complex.
48. The case involved the Quechee Lakes Development Corp. The Land Gains
Tax Division believed the Department of Taxes' denial of a deduction for promo-
tional costs deterred developers of large subdivisions from using high pressure sales
tactics. We interviewed several lawyers who disagreed with this contention. They
believed that a taxpayer's inability to increase basis by adding on promotional and
other remote costs does not deter development because Vermont does not attract such
sophisticated investors. These attorneys believe the land gains tax itself, rather than
its components, provides the disincentive to development.
49. See note 37 and accompanying text supra.
50. In Langrock v. Dep't of Taxes, 139 Vt. 108, 423 A.2d 838 (1980), the Vermont
Supreme Court placed limits on the benefits sellers may realize from changes in hold-
ing periods and sales prices, by interpreting the rate schedule as progressive. See note
37 and accompanying text supra.
51. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, §§ 10002(a), 10005(b) (1973). Former Vermont
Tax Commissioner Robert Lathrop said allocating realized gain between taxable land
and tax exempt buildings on the property is one of the Department's most difficult
administrative problems.
52. Id. at §§ 10002(a), (b).
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a. A1ocating Gain Between Land and Buildings
Many of Vermont's landowners have built structures on their
properties. Thus, in many taxable land transactions, sellers may take
advantage of the provision that exempts the value of these structures
from the taxable gain realized on the sale of the land.53 This addi-
tional calculation of land gains tax liability makes it more difficult for
the state to administer the tax.
For example, suppose a resident of New York bought a second
home in Vermont in 1975 and sold it within four years for a gain of
$20,000. Part of this $20,000 would be allocable to the exempt struc-
ture while the remainder would be allocable to the non-exempt taxa-
ble land. The land gains tax statute provides that gain realized shall
be allocated between land and buildings on the basis of "fair market
value".54 The statute neither elaborates on the meaning of "fair mar-
ket value" nor explains when it is determined.
Theoretically, the exemption should not necessarily make tax ad-
ministration complex. If landowners would value land and buildings
separately upon acquisition and disposition, they could isolate the
land value at sale to determine its appreciation over the term of own-
ership. Unfortunately, few landowners make such calculations of
value at purchase and sale. Indeed, in most situations they would
face an extremely difficult task if they tried to reconstruct the alloca-
tions after the fact. Instead, Vermont allocates taxable gain between
land and buildings in proportion to land value at the time of sale.
Determining the taxable gain, however, is not impossible because the
owner can take advantage of several allocation techniques.
1.) Methods to Determine Allocation
A) Assessments. Vermont property taxpayers may rely on the lo-
cal tax assessor's allocation of value between land and structures to
determine the gain realized at sale. These assessors, or "listers", cal-
culate separately the values of the land and the structures on the par-
cel in order to levy local real property taxes.55 The State Department
53. Id. at § 10002(a).
54. VT. STAT. AMN. tit. 32, § 10005(b) (1973).
55. Returning to our example, the New York second home seller realized a total
gain of $20,000 for allocation between the building and the underlying land. The
owner might look at the property tax bill for the house and land, and allocate the gain
on the basis of the local lister's determination. He might find that the lister had allo-
cated one-fourth of the value of the property to the land, and the remainder to the
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of Taxes often will accept such allocations as evidence of current val-
ues of the land and buildings. The Department believes this method
of valuation promotes simplicity in tax administration. This valua-
tion, however, may be misleading if the lister's analysis of the relative
value of land and buildings occurred earlier than the date of sale.
B) Town Land Value Tables. A second alternative for taxpayers
trying to calculate the value of structures is to examine town land
value tables. The Department of Taxes prepares these summaries to
equalize state aid to local governments. The tables seek to determine
the "tax effort" of each town, so that communities that undervalued
property for local tax purposes do not receive an unfair benefit in
local aid because they appeared "poorer". Both the taxpayer and the
state may use these tables as a guide to the values of real property.56
C) State Assistance. The State of Vermont has not ignored the
allocation problems. The Department of Taxes responded in 1977 by
establishing certain "presumptions" depending on the location of the
land. First, for property in the City of Burlington, it allocated to the
land alone twenty-five percent of the total fair market value of a par-
cel that included a residential building. Second, it made a similar
calculation of eighteen percent for lots in villages and other commu-
nities. Finally, it allocated eight percent to land containing condo-
miniums. These calculations are somewhat arbitrary, but they do
offer a guide to the seller who can exempt the value of structures
from the taxable gain realized from a land transfer.
2.) Depreciable Property
Depreciable property is a separate problem for sellers trying to al-
locate realized gain between exempt and non-exempt taxable
sources.57 Annual deductions for depreciation decrease the prop-
structure. Following such an appraisal, the state would tax one-quarter or $5,000 of
the $20,000 total gain for land gains tax purposes.
56. For example, assume the land value table lists an average acre of property at
$325. If an owner sold a 300-acre parcel for $120,000, he would multiply 300 by $325
by .95 (a factor the drafters of the table designed to represent adjustments in per acre
prices depending on the size of the parcel). The resulting total land value would be
$92,625. If the taxpayer had allocated to the land only $60,000 of the total sale price
and attributed the remainder to structures on the property, the Department of Taxes
would question how the taxpayer made the allocation.
57. Depreciable property is real estate, such as an apartment building or vacation
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erty's basis from the original purchase price level. This lower basis
results in stiffer land gains tax liability for the seller. 8 The taxpayer,
however, may recapture this lost value attributable to depreciation
because of federal tax treatment of resale.
For example, assume that a rentable vacation house 59 and land
cost $50,000, and the house has a useful life of forty years and a
"cost" of $40,000. In a simplified example, the taxpayer could deduct
$1,000 per year against rental income, representing the straight-line
depreciation of the house (not the land) spread over its useful life. If
the taxpayer chose instead to sell the property in the fifth year of
ownership, the depredation would have reduced the cost basis in the
house from $40,000 to $35,000. If the owner sells the whole property
for $70,000 he or she would realize a federally taxable gain of
$35,000, including $15,000 of depreciation recapture.
Vermont, however, disregards depreciation costs when it calculates
a seller's land gains tax liability. The Department of Taxes relies ex-
clusively on the original cost basis to determine total gain, then allo-
cates that gain, based on the current fair market value, between the
land and structure. In the example, Vermont would ignore the $5,000
depreciation recapture on the structure, and treat as taxable only the
$20,000 of gain that would then be allocated between the taxable
land and the exempt building.
3.) New Construction
The previous section demonstrates some of the problems inherent
in distinguishing the value of land from existing structures when cal-
culating taxable gain. Vermont has adopted a separate administra-
tive procedure for the analogous problem of valuing new
construction. The Department of Taxes allocates gain on new con-
struction in proportion to its basis, or relative cost.
For example, assume a builder of a second home purchases a lot
for $10,000, erects a structure at a cost of $40,000, and then sells both
house, that produces federally taxable income. A property owner determines this in-
come by deducting operating expenses, and a yearly "depreciation" amount that
spreads the cost of the building over its useful life. Land does not depreciate.
58. See notes 39-43 and accompanying text pupra.
59. A land transfer involving a vacation homesite is subject to gains tax liability.
The parties' transaction would be exempt from taxation if they intended that the
property be used for a primary homesite. See notes 61-62 and accompanying text
infra.
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within a year of acquisition for a net return of $20,000. Department
regulations would allocate the $20,000 gain between land and build-
ings in proportion to basis. The building has contributed $40,000
worth of basis compared to $10,000 for the land. Eighty percent of
the $20,000 gain realized would be allocable to the structure, and
therefore exempt. The remaining $4,000 would be taxable land gain.
This allocation process means that if land has appreciated signifi-
cantly since acquisition, owners may erect structures that assist in
"sponging up" otherwise taxable gain. On the other hand, if a lot
does not appreciate significantly, the Department's formulas may
capture gain that really results from new construction.
4.) Evaluation of Structural Exemption
The problem of allocating gain between land and buildings is the
most difficult job in land gains tax administration. As noted earlier,
Vermont could have avoided much administrative difficulty by
adopting the federal capital gains model and taxing all gains derived
from real estate. Instead, it accepted such difficulty in order to
achieve a more focused regulatory objective.60 The problem of allo-
cating gain between land and structures might dissuade another juris-
diction from imitating this feature of Vermont's law, where revenue,
not deterrence of land speculation, is that jurisdiction's only concern.
Significantly, we found little evidence of developers undertaking
construction on their newly-built subdivisions just to take advantage
of regulations on allocating gain between land and buildings. The
economic incentive to build may produce such small savings that it is
a marginal consideration. Alternatively, developers may still be rela-
tively ignorant of the potential land gains tax savings they might real-
ize by erecting a structure that can "sponge up" the gain on the
underlying land.
This allocation problem may also be exaggerated. Such situations
do not seem to be a significant portion of the total tax population.
Where buildings do exist on the land, many may be the owner's pri-
mary residence. This leads to an examination of a second aspect of
60. One criticism of the Vermont tax is that it is not focused enough, applying to
sales of downtown commercial property where the environmental impacts of short-
term transfers are minimal. Taxing gain on commercial structures not only raises the
problem of depreciation recapture, but also deters transfers of commercial property
that are arguably not within the purpose of the Vermont law.
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the Vermont land gains tax--exemption for transfers of land contain-
ing the seller's primary homesite.
b. Tax Exemptions of Primary tHomesites
Jurisdictions considering a land gains tax should closely scrutinize
the Vermont provision that exempts transfers of primary homesites.
Vermont apparently believed this exemption to be good public pol-
icy.6 The legislature expanded the primary homesite each time it
amended the law,62 although lawmakers may also have been re-
sponding to political pressures from people facing land gains tax
burdens.
Politics, however, fails to totally explain the expansion of the pri-
mary homesite exemption. Vermont legislators also did not intend
the tax to have an impact on people who make a commitment to use
land for residential purposes. The state aims the tax at a different
population-those who buy and sell land to make a profit, and not to
live on it.
For example, a subdivider acquires a 100-acre parcel in 1977 for
$100,000. Eighteen months later, having subdivided the parcel into
lots, he sells a lot. The buyer certifies that he will build his principal
residence on the lot, or that he will sell to someone who will make the
structure his principal residence. The seller pays no tax, because the
buyer has shown a willingness to live on the property rather than
profiting on it at resale. The purchaser's failure to meet these condi-
tions within the time period specified in the law can result in his pay-
61. Since April 17, 1978, Vermont has made it easier for a purchaser to claim the
principal residence exemption. The purchaser need only disclose the exemption in
the property tax return, dispensing with the original requirement that the purchaser
file certifications that the land will be used or modified to serve as a permanent resi-
dence. Failure to disclose under the old regulations subjected the purchaser to the
liability of the seller, who had presumably avoided the land gains tax by transferring
the property to a buyer who promised to use it as a primary residence.
62. Originally, the exemption applied only if the owner was selling a principal
residence of up to one acre. The legislature passed a series of amendments making
more parties to a land transaction and larger homesites eligible for the exemption.
See note 12 supra. These changes, however, did not alter the filing and certification
process for a seller who seeks to avoid the tax through sale to a builder. The builder
must certify that construction will begin within a year of the sale of a principal resi-
dence, that construction will be completed within two years, and that a buyer will
purchase the homesite within three years. The seller must make certifications
throughout this process, or the builder/purchaser is liable for the tax. VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 32, § 10002(b) (1973).
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ing any tax that the subdivider-seller would otherwise have paid on
the sale.
c. Conclusion
The structure and primary homesite exemptions decrease the
amount of property subject to land gains taxation. In return for this
lost revenue, Vermont obtains a more focused tax designed to regu-
late the short-term landowner63 who buys a large parcel of open land
with no intent to build a primary home on the land. The experience
in Vermont also suggests that many of these people are often inves-
tors from out-of-state. The land gains tax effectively then becomes as
"extraction" tax as these speculators remove a piece of Vermont's re-
sources to other places.
Vermont's decision to exempt transfers of land that are primary
homesites while taxing similar transactions involving secondary
homesites seems logical. The large second home subdivision may
leave many lots unused or unsold, resulting in land that never fulfills
its potential economic purpose as a second homesite."4 Conse-
quently, the land can serve no alternative, productive use.
Other jurisdictions worried about land speculation may be con-
cerned over more than speculation in large parcels, or in second
homesites. Vermont's primary residence exemption might be inap-
propriate in these locations. For example, the District of Columbia
passed its new anti-speculation ordinance largely because speculation
caused a rapid turnover in housing.
Consequently, any jurisdiction considering a land gains tax should
be careful before it copies the Vermont law verbatim. Legislators
should evaluate the Vermont law, its subsequent modifications, and
their own local needs. The Vermont model may not be effective if
lawmakers apply it to their particular land market conditions.
C. How the Tax is Collected and Processed
The authors of the land gains tax may have borrowed heavily from
the language of federal tax law, but they departed from the federal
model to set up their own system of filing returns. Vermont does not
require the seller of a land parcel to file a land gains tax return with
63. See note 37 supra.
64. See note 20 supra.
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the state income tax return at the end of the taxable year. Instead,
Vermont collects the tax at the time of the taxable land transfer.6 5
Generally the seller reports information to the state that would ap-
pear on federal Form 1040, Schedule D: sale price, transfer costs,
cost basis, and so forth."
The law is flexible. If the seller does not have the money to pay the
tax at the actual time of transfer, he or she may pay within thirty days
of transfer. The seller must pay the full tax in advance, or else the
buyer must withhold ten percent of the transfer payment attributable
to land and remit the withholding and a proper form to the state.67
Exempt transactions are not subject to withholding. The seller then
has the burden to settle with the state by filing a land gains tax return
and remitting a balance due or filing for a refund of excess withhold-
ing paid. This procedure uses the land sale closing process to deter
taxpayer avoidknce of the law. 8 The land gains tax is also a personal
debt of those liable to pay or withhold it, and may constitute a lien in
favor of Vermont "upon all property and rights to property, whether
real or personal, belonging to the persons liable for the tax or for the
withholding. '"69
The Department of Taxes screens each return for unusual tax cir-
cumstances and determines if it should further scrutinize a transac-
tion or filer. This "desk audit" compares the price and land use
65. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 10007(b) (1973).
66. The Internal Revenue Service does not require advance disclosure of potential
tax liability for a capital gains transaction. (The IRS makes an exception for advance
payment of estimated taxes.) The IRS instead allows such liability to be disclosed
when the taxpayer files a Form 1040, Schedule D, federal income tax return. Thus,
the taxpayer has up to three and one-half months after the close of the taxable year
(or longer if the I.R.S. grants extensions) to pay a federal income tax on any gain a
taxpayer realized from the sale or exchange of a capital asset owned.
67. See generally VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 10007 (1973). The authors of the Dis-
trict of Columbia speculation tax, D.C. CODE. ANN. Section 47-3301 et. seq. (Supp.
1980) chose to require filing of a return and payment of any tax due within 30 days
after the taxable transfer. Newspaper accounts, however, indicate widespread early
non-compliance with the tax.
68. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 10007 (1973). The chief of the Land Gains Tax
Division reports that realtors are now accustomed to the tax and regularly follow the
withholding procedure. About 20% of the sellers filing returns through June, 1977,
obtained a certificate from the Division stating the exact amount due. The purchaser
withholds only that amount at the closing of the transfer.
69. Id. § 10007(e). Wilful evasion of the land gains tax carries a penalty of up to
one year in prison, or a fine of $10,000 or five times the amount of tax evaded (which-
ever is larger), or both. Id. § 10010 (1973).
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information with earlier land transfer tax returns and land gains tax
returns. The Department staff'7° makes a mathematical check after
the desk audit. It will not audit an exempt transaction.
States considering passage of their own land gains tax should note
that Vermont can improve its tax collection process. The land gains
tax form is difficult for the lay taxpayer to understand without profes-
sional assistance.7 The state could further help taxpayers by follow-
ing the federal lead and offering a supplementary guide of tax
calculation examples. Vermont could also keep its citizens more
current on developments in the tax law and regulations by publishing
rulings on frequently recurring issues.72 Finally, aside from the
mechanics of filing, Vermont might find it can process the tax returns
accurately by investing in computerized audit and data storage.
These procedural recommendations could help Vermont to achieve
the regulatory goals of the land gains tax. An improved form would
help the lay taxpayer who cannot afford professional advice to better
understand his tax liability.73 Also, while audit procedures often
70. Three people staff the division: its chief, an auditor, and a clerk-typist. A
field examiner and property appraiser provide part-time assistance, and the tax de-
partment offers service such as legal assistance. The division's substantive work in-
cludes answering taxpayer questions, designing the land gains tax form, and
scrutinizing returns involving installment sales, easements, foreclosures, divorces, and
special cases.
Vermont's small size allows it to keep its tax administration informal, and efficient.
The staff and the private bar quickly developed a degree of personal trust and confi-
dence that bureaucracies in larger states might not be able to develop. We cannot
underestimate the importance of efficient tax administration in evaluating its success.
Vermont attorneys interviewed had few complaints about the state's administration of
the law.
71. We found it difficult to evaluate the cost to the private sector of calculating tax
liability and filing returns. Several attorneys did say that the forms are difficult to
prepare, despite the department's efforts to explain the federal tax concepts and terms
that are incorporated into the state forms. Filers were also concerned about the diffi-
culty in calculating the tax. We performed a random, computerized check of 1,000
returns filed over a three year period, and found some inconsistent entries, mathemat-
ical errors, and apparently unnecessary use of the complicated tax calculation sched-
ules. The process may be needlessly unfair to the lay taxpayer. See notes 73-74 and
accompanying text, infra.
72. The Land Gains Tax Division currently limits itself to occasional advisory
opinions. These opinions are usually oral, for an individual's assistance, and not
binding on the tax department. The Vermont Administrative Procedure Act does
provide for the issuance of binding, formal rulings. No taxpayer has requested such a
ruling, but the former deputy tax commissioner believes such a procedure would help
the department and taxpayers solve specific problems.
73. Another important reason for simplifying the tax form and calculations is that
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catch questionable returns that professional investors and sophisti-
cated taxpayers may file, few taxpayers chose to attempt clever tax
avoidance devices; most potential investors opted instead not to
buy.
74
IV. AN EVALUATION OF THE IMPACTS OF THE VERMONT LAND
GAINS TAX
What has been the impact of the land gains tax in Vermont? Who
pays the tax? What has it done to land prices? What has it done to
the Vermont land market? After a brief discussion of the study's
methodology, this section attempts to answer these crucial
questions.
A. Methodology
Several factors contributed to the difficulty in accurately evaluating
the impact of the Vermont land gains tax. The tax was introduced
into a relatively active regulatory environment. In addition, the Arab
oil embargo and the national economic recession beginning in 1973
put a strain on the Vermont real estate market, especially for second
homes. At the local level, Vermont's short ski seasons in 1973 and
1974 led to poor sales in the second home market. Thus, the study
had to use a methodology that could isolate the impact of the land
gains tax independent of these extraneous factors.
Professional social science researchers and experts on Vermont's
real estate community helped to develop four different methodologies
for evaluating the tax. As indicated earlier, these methodologies con-
sisted of personal interviews, an analysis of sample Vermont land
gains tax returns, a nationwide telephone survey75 of a sample of
over 600 individuals who bought or subdivided significant parcels of
taxpayers can negotiate their land use gains tax. The tax differs from other taxes such
as the estate tax that does not automatically exempt small transactions. Thus, taxpay-,
ers who did not consult a tax attorney or other expert might logically presume that the
formula for the tax computations, the apportionment between land and buildings,
and the deduction of holding and selling costs were not negotiable. Unsophisticated
and first-time sellers, or those who lack the skill or means to negotiate their tax liabil-
ity will likely pay more tax than is necessary.
74. See notes 15-23 and accompanying text supra.
75. The Lincoln Institute of Land Policy in Cambridge, Mass. provided the
financial support to enable the undertaking of the survey.
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Vermont land from 1968 to 1977, and land price comparisons of com-
parable sets of Vermont and New Hampshire towns.
The first research technique was a series of one to two hour per-
sonal interviews with approximately seventy Vermont individuals
likely to be well-informed about the Vermont land gains tax or the
Vermont land market. These included investors, developers, real es-
tate brokers, lawyers, public officials, legislators, and bankers. These
interviews revealed widely conflicting opinions about what had been
the impact of the land gains tax. While a useful source of back-
ground, these interviews demonstrated the need for three supplemen-
tal methodologies to reach an evaluation of the revenue and
regulatory impacts of the tax.
A second research technique analyzed a sample of 1,000 Vermont
land gains tax returns received in the period from 1973 through 1976.
The Vermont Department of Taxes protected the identity of the tax-
payers by withholding names and location of the property. The De-
partment made all other information on the form available for study,
including: the type of parcel; length of holding period; purchase
price; sale price; brokerage commission paid; attorney fees; and the
amount of land gains tax due. Additionally, the Department pro-
vided information about the income disclosed on Vermont income
tax returns for those individuals whose names appeared on the land
gains tax return sample as either the seller or the buyer. The Depart-
ment disclosed the unidentified seller's or buyer's reported total ad-
justed gross income (net business income or wages and investment
income prior to personal deductions for such costs as medical ex-
penses, home property taxes, etc.). Corporations and many non-resi-
dent buyers and sellers were excluded from this income profile
because the Vermont Department of Taxes did not have this personal
income information. Moreover, adjusted gross income is not a com-
plete index of household income, wealth, or property holdings. Even
within these limitations, however, the data were sufficient to show the
distribution of the tax according to individual income. This tax re-
turn analysis forms the basis of the revenue-raising impact section76
immediately following this methodological introduction.
The third research technique was a nationwide telephone survey of
key Vermont land market participants conducted by the center for
76. See Section IV-B and accompanying text infra.
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Survey Research in Boston, a joint facility of Harvard, the University
of Massachusetts, and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
This group was defined as those who had purchased a parcel of
Vermont land, of at least 100 acres, sometime between 1968 and 1978
when the survey was done. A sample of such returns was drawn from
public records to produce interviews with approximately 150 pur-
chasers in each of three time periods: before Act 250, between Act
250 and passage of the land gains taxes, and after passage of the land
gains tax, or 1968-70, 1970-73, and 1973 respectively. In addition, the
survey team interviewed a supplemental sample of about 250 individ-
uals who filed for a subdivision permit during 1968-1977 and ana-
lyzed their responses.
Because the survey was relatively novel, the questionnaire received
both a customary pre-test and a pilot survey of forty-five interviews
in order to produce the final questionnaire form. Carefully designed
to avoid calling attention to the land gains taxper se, the question-
naire focused on the land market in general. The questions asked of
the purchaser included: what kind of land was purchased; what the
purchaser intended to do with it; what did he actually do with it;
what was his understanding of the land gains tax, Act 250, and subdi-
vision regulations; and to what degree he felt these factors influenced
his decision to buy this particular parcel. With computer assistance,
researchers analyzed this information as a function of time to see if
notable changes in the Vermont land market occurred since the en-
actment of the tax. In addition, the survey included direct questions
about the land gains tax. Researchers analyzed the answers to these
questions to determine any links to changes in the Vermont land
market.
The survey analysis also involved asking why the purchasers
bought the land. Based on these responses, the study divided the re-
spondents into two groups: those who purchased land to live on, and
those who purchased property as an investment. This categorization
allowed for further analysis of each group.
Finally, the fourth methodology was an analysis of land prices,
which is described in more detail in that section, below.
B. Revenue Raising Impact
As previously discussed, one reason behind the enactment of the
land gains tax was to generate revenue to fund a statewide property
tax relief program. This section seeks to evaluate the effectiveness of
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the tax in meeting this goal by examining two issues. First, how
much revenue did the tax raise? Second, who paid the tax? This
second question is significant in view of the legislative intent to redis-
tribute the property tax burden from primary homesite owners to
speculators.
Vermont has not reaped a revenue windfall from the land gains
tax. The state only received between $500,000 and $1,100,000 annu-
ally between 1973 and 1977. Other states can conceivably obtain sig-
nificantly more revenue if they structure the tax differently. In
attempting to narrowly focus the regulatory impact of the statute
through the primary homesite and structure exemptions, Vermont
made the policy choice to forego this potential revenue. Other states
obviously may make a different policy judgment. In addition, other
states may receive more revenue depending upon the prices and the
activity in their land markets.
After determining how much revenue the land gains tax raised, the
study used the tax return sample to determine who paid the tax. Spe-
cifically, we looked at such taxpayer characteristics as: filing status,
residency, and income.
Filing Status and Residency
Vermont residents paid the bulk of the land gains tax. Individual
residents accounted for half of the revenue, and corporations paid an
additional ten to twenty percent. Non-resident investors provided
the rest of the state's land gains tax income. Out-of-state revenues
TABLE I
WHO PAID THE VERMONT LAND GAINS TAX?
(by fiscal year, tax status, and residency)
(Source: random sample of 1,000 land gains tax returns)
Percent of Land Gains Tax Revenue
fiscal Vermont non-resident
year individual corporate estate individual corporate estate total*
1973-74 52 9 1 30 6 - 98
1974-75 55 16 3 14 4 - 92
1975-76 50 8 11 27 3 - 99
1976-77 55 23 3 16 3 - 100
Total does not add to 100 percent because the land gains tax return gave incom-
plete information, and due to elimination of the foreign residency category on this
table.
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from twenty to forty percent annually might be welcome, because
these sums represent revenue the state might not otherwise receive.
This policy choice also means that in-state residents will shoulder the
bulk of the tax burden.
Taxpayer Income
The tax return analysis disclosed a limited correlation between
land gains tax paid and income. The analysis presents average ad-
justed gross income reported for individuals filing Vermont income
tax returns. (Such income does not disclose wealth. A taxpayer may
own substantial wealth without receiving significant income, or have
substantially adjusted income that deflates reportable income.) With
these concerns in mind, we did find that people in all classes of in-
come, including those making less than $4,000 per year, realized gain
on short-term land sales. The state collected an average tax ranging
from $150 to $425 per taxable transaction from all income levels.
Taxpayers reporting less than $10,000 in adjusted gross income paid
about $100 less in land gains taxes than high income taxpayers.
Table 3 puts these income categories in better perspective. The
clear bar graph indicates the percentage of Vermont personal income
taxpayers in each income group, and the cross-hatched bars show the
percentage of land gains taxes they paid. We can conclude from a
comparison of the two bar heights that all income groups buy and sell
land, earn profits in the land market, and pay the land gains tax.
Only the sellers in the $25,000-50,000 income class paid proportion-
ately more tax than their incidence in the taxpaying population.
One surprising statistical finding that provides greater insight into
who bears the land gains tax burden is the comparison of taxable
income with the amount of land gains tax paid for each bracket of
profitability. The following tables reveal the surprising fact that Ver-
mont residents with annual incomes of less than $4,000 profitably in-
vested in real estate. Note, however, the significant amount of tax
raised from taxpayers in the sample for whom personal income tax
data were not available because they paid no individual Vermont in-
come tax, presumably because of non-residency or status as a
business.
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TABLE 2
AVERAGE LAND GAINS TAX PAID PER TAXABLE
TRANSACTION BY ADJUSTED GROSS SELLER
INCOME*
1973-1976
(SOURCE: RANDOM SAMPLE OF 1,000 LAND GAINS TAX RETURNS)
Average
Land Gain
Tax Paid
Per Taxable
Transaction
Sampled
(dollars)
500 -
450 -
400 -
350 -
300 -
250 -
200 -
150 -
100 -
50 -
0-4 4-6 6-8 8-10 10-15 15-25 25-50 50+ UNK
Income of Seller
(thousands of dollars)
Report from individuals filing Vermont income tax returns only; no data on
partnerships or corporations.
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TABLE 3
COMPARISON OF PERCENT OF LAND GAINS TAX PAID
AND PERCENT OF VERMONT PERSONAL
INCOME TAx RETURNS FILED BY
INCOME
(SOURCE: RANDOM SAMPLE OF LAND GAINS TAX RETURNS)
Percent
60-
55 '
50-
45-
40-
35-
30-
25-J
20 -
15 -
10 -
5 -
0-4 i 4-6 1 6-8 8-10 1 101 5 1 15-25 125150 1 50t+
Average Adjusted Income of Seller
(thousands of dollars)
o Percent of 1975 Vermont Personal Income Tax Returns filed
o Percent of 1973-1976 LGT paid
Income classes for LGT and VT Personal Income tax payment are not strictly
comparable because Vermont Income tax data are not presented by income
for nonresident taxpayers.
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TABLE 4
PERCENT OF LAND GAINS TAX PAID BY SELLER INCOME
IN EACH LAND GAINS TAX CATEGORY OF
LAND GAINS AS A % OF COST
(Source: random sample of 1,000 Vermont land gains tax returns)
LGT tax paid
11.4
200+%
100-99%
0-99% 10-99w 10-99%
0- 14-6
13.5 4.1
LGT Taxpayers*
0-99%
H 200+
099z%
8-10" 10-15 115-25 1 25-50 I 50+ I
6.3 9.2 11.0 5.6 1.4
' Average Adjusted Gross Income of Sellcr (thousands of dollars)2 see tax paid by sellers with income unknown below
Tax paid by selers with income unknown: (43.5% of Land Gains Taxpa)crs
sample)
0 - 99,7e 31.2
100-199%: 16.2 %ofLGTpaid
200+%: 24 o
49.8
1030-I9re -
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TABLE 5
DISTRIBUTION OF LAND GAINS TAX PAID BY SELLERS
INCOME AND TAX RATE AS A PERCENTAGE OF
GAIN ON LAND
1973-1976
(Source: random sample of 1,000 land gains tax returns)
%ofLGT I
j 10-15%
10,
5 , - 15 %
7.5% __
6-8 8-10 110-15 '15-25
9.9 93 17.3 12.8
25%I
5.5~
25-50' 50+ 'UNK * 1
3.0 0.6
$ Income
% Income Tax
Returns
Average Adjusted Gross Income of Seller
(thousands of dollars) & % of 1975 Vt. Income Tax Returns
Percent of LGT tax remus pad by sellers th income unknon:
5, 75% 6.3% 30-40%: 12.4%
10, 15% 194% 50%; -0.%
20-25% 1 12% 60%: 0.5%
NOTE, Income clsts for LOT and Vt. Personal Income tax payments are not
sroly comparable because Vermont Income tax data are not presented by
income foe non-rsent
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In trying to examine the question of who pays the tax, we only
looked at the party who had the legal obligation to pay the tax-the
seller. By placing the legal incidence of the tax on the seller, the Ver-
mont legislature sought to regulate that seller's behavior in the land
market. The actual economic incidence of the tax, however, does not
necessarily have to coincide with the legal incidence. A seller may
try to minimize the impact of the tax by shifting the economic burden
to the purchaser by including the tax in the sale price. It can be ar-
gued however, that the seller cannot successfully escape the tax bur-
den because if he inflates the price of the land, it may not sell. If the
land does not sell, the seller should reduce his price, thus absorbing
the burden of the tax. This study does not attempt to decide this issue
of whether the seller or buyer shoulders the tax.
C. Regulatory Impact
The second primary goal of the tax was to deter speculators from
entering the Vermont land market. The research suggested two con-
sequences of achieving this goal: controlling subdivision and control-
ling land prices. This section discusses the findings on whether the
tax achieved these expectancies.
1. Has the Land Gains Tax Deterred Speculators and Subdividers
From Entering the Vermont Land Market?77
The answer to this question was largely drawn from the survey
data. The methodology has been described above, but involved using
the answers of two sets of respondents-certain large parcel purchas-
ers and subdividers-to determine how the characteristics of buyers
have changed over time and how they responded to the land gains
tax. We determined from the survey that the land gains tax at least
partially influenced the purchase, sale, and development decisions of
certain investors, as well as subdividers, to withdraw from the land
market. We base our conclusion on a variety of data, including evi-
77. Recall from our background discussion that Vermont's regulatory purpose for
enacting the land gains tax was to deter speculation. We noted that one possible
consequence of the tax achieving this goal was to control land subdivision. In the
following survey of the law's regulatory impact, we asked the same questions of all
purchasers regardless of their reasons for buying or their subsequent land use
decisions. Speculation and subdivision are distinguishable types of land behavior,
and the survey analyzes the answers of these purchasers separately. When such
subdividers appear in tables they are separately set out. All other references are to
purchasers of parcels of 100 acres in size or more.
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dence showing: (1) an increase in the number of purchasers who
brought 100 acre parcels of land to live on and to farm; (2) a de-
crease in the number of purchasers who bought such land as an in-
vestment; and (3) that such investors (as well as subdividers) were
more familiar with the terms and implications of the tax than were
those who purchased for other purposes. Moreover, such investors
and subdividers, more than any other purchasers, said the tax influ-
enced their decisions.78
What follows is a more detailed analysis of these general findings.
First, our findings on the identity of large parcel purchasers added to
the evidence that some investors withdrew from the Vermont land
market following passage of the tax. For example, the number of
lawyers, brokers, and developers in the population that purchased
parcels of at least 100 acres after 1968 significantly declined after
1973. The number of farmers buying land increased substantially
TABLE 6
MAIN OCCUPATION OF OWNERS OF 100-ACRE PARCELS
BY DATE OF ACQUISITION
Date of Acquisition
1968- 1971- May 1973-
Occupation 1970 April 1973 1978
Lawyers 6% 7% 2%
Other professionals 26 31 19
Realtors, brokers, developers, builders 13 4 4
Farmers 21 30 45
Other businessmen 12 12 13
Others 22 16 17
Total 100% 100% 100%
N = 151 136 163
* The percentage figures in this and subsequent tables are based on weighted distri-
butions that adjust for the differential probability of selection of particular owners
and particular parcels of land. The N's given, however, are the number of inter-
views on which percentages are based.
The careful readers will also note that the N's provided throughout the report are
not exact. For some percentage distributions, there were missing data because
uncodable answers were given. Generally, percentages given are based only on
the number of persons giving codable answers. This number varies slightly from
answer to answer. The weighted computer output did not provide the exact un-
weighted numbers. The numbers given certainly provide the information needed
to assess the reliability of the percentages. However, they are approximations.
78. See table 22 infra.
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during this period, though these trends occurred gradually during the
years studied.
One would expect that if fewer investors entered the Vermont land
market, a corresponding decrease would follow in the number of pur-
chasers who at least derive part of their income from real estate de-
velopment. The survey confirmed this expectation in two separate
findings. First, fewer buyers of major parcels of Vermont land said
they earn income on real estate. Second, the number of purchasers of
Vermont land who also owned major parcels outside Vermont de-
creased after 1973.
TABLE 7
PERCENTAGE OF OWNER'S INCOME FROM REAL ESTATE
INVESTMENTS BY DATE OF ACQUISITION
Percent of Income
From Real Estate
No income from real estate
1-10%
11% or more
Total
N=
Date of Acquisition
1968- 1971- May 1973-
1970 April 1973 1978
57% 55% 69%
24 28 17
19 17 14
100% 100% 100%
141 136 163
TABLE 8
NUMBER OF PARCELS OF ANY SIZE OWNED OUTSIDE
VERMONT IN PAST TEN YEARS BY DATE OF
ACQUISITION
(of Selected Parcel)
Number of Parcels
No parcels
One parcel
Two or more parcels
Total
N =
Date of Acquisition
1968- 1971- May 1973-
1970 April 1973 1978
46% 51% 63%
20 16 17
34 33 20
100% 100% 100%
141 136 163
Note that thirty-four percent of the Vermont land purchasers
before 1970 owned two or more parcels in other states, compared to
twenty percent after 1973. In the same period, we found no signifi-
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TABLE 9
NUMBER OF OTHER 100-ACRE PARCELS OWNED IN
VERMONT IN PAST TEN YEARS BY DATE OF
ACQUISITION
(of Selected Parcel)
Date of Acquisition
Number of Other 1968- 1971- May 1973-
100-Acre Parcels Owned 1970 April 1973 1978
None 65% 65% 63%
One 12 16 21
Two or more 23 20 16
Total 100% 100% 100%
N = 141 136 163
cant change in the number of persons owning more than one parcel
in Vermont as opposed to other states, leading to a conclusion that
some purchasers who bought multiple parcels in other states left Ver-
mont after 1973.
We did find some interesting patterns when comparing investor
plans for their land at the time of purchase and their subsequent land
use decisions. The most important change occurred in planned hold-
ing or selling patterns. We saw earlier in our sample of all purchasers
of large parcels no particular trend. But when we isolate investors in
this sample,-i.e. those who said their reason for purchase was invest-
ment-those investors who bought after 1973 (when the land gains
tax took effect) were much more likely to plan to hold the property
indefinitely than previously. The land gains tax hits hardest those
who hold their property for short times before selling it.
We have surveyed large parcel purchasers in the Vermont land
market, and found that those who bought for investment rather than
for use made fewer purchases after enactment of the land gains tax.
We also found that those who invested after 1973 more frequently
planned to hold their property, rather than sell quickly. We also ana-
lyzed large parcel purchaser motives for buying, and found an in-
crease in the proportion of purchases for residential purposes after
Vermont passed the land gains tax. The survey examined whether
the purchaser ever lived on the land and if so, whether the land was a
primary residence or a secondary, seasonal property. The most dra-
matic change in the buying/living pattern occurred on seasonal
1981]
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TABLE 10
SELECTED PLANS OF INVESTORS* IN 100-ACRE PARCELS
BY DATE OF ACQUISITION
Date of Acquisition
1963- 1971- May 1973-
Planned to Sub-divide 1970 April 1973 1978
Yes 31% 18% 34%
No 69 82 66
Total 100% 100% 100%
Sale Plans
Planned to resell 66 65 43
Planned to hold indefinitely 34 35 57
Total 100% 100% 100%
Planned to Build Houses
Yes 16 22 26
No 84 78 74
Total 100% 100% 100%
N = 59 44 41
* Said main purpose of acquiring land was investment.
homesites. Considerably fewer purchasers lived on their property
part-time in the early 1970,s. 7 1
Given the increased number of land purchases for primary resi-
dential use, we expected that recent buyers would more likely live in
Vermont during the later period studied than did purchasers in ear-
lier times. The survey findings support our expectation, and also
show that fewer non-residents purchased property in Vermont after
1973.
The findings that more people bought land for their own purposes
are consistent with the evidence of investors dropping out of the mar-
ket after 1973. The result was surprising, however, when we isolated
one of these private use purposes-farming. We found a dramatic
79. We also gained insight into residential buying patterns by studying income
producing property. The survey revealed a consistent pattern of rental income from
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increase in purchases for farm use that exceeded the decline of inves-
tor competition for land. After 1973, almost half of the owners of
100-acre parcels were farmers, compared to only about one-third pre-
viously. In the same table that revealed a decline in rental income
from property, we also found a dramatic increase in the purchase rate
TABLE 11
YEAR-ROUND VERMONT LIVING STATUS OF OWNERS BY
DATE OF ACQUISITION OF PARCELS OF MORE
THAN 100 AcREs
Date of Acquisition
Year-Round Vermont 1968- 1971- May 1973-
Living Status 1970 April 1973 1978
Currently living in Vermont year round 58% 69% 82%
Previously lived in Vermont year round, 10 9 3
currently lives out of state
Never lived in Vermont year round 31 22 15
Total 100% 100% 100%
N = 141 136 163
of working farms. Buyers operated almost half of these parcels as
working farms compared to only about one-third previously. Thus,
parcels purchased after 1973 were much more likely to produce farm
parcels purchased before 1971. Rental income is a frequent concomitant of seasonal
property ownership. The finding confirms the existence of a trend away from secon-
dary homesite purchases.
Table 13
Sources of Income for Sample of Purchasers of 100-Plus Acre Parcels Selected
Parcel by Date of Parcel Acquisition
Date of Acquisition
1968- 1971 May 1973-
Sources of Income 1970 April 1973 1978
No income 40% 42% 36%
Rents 12 5 6
Farming 33 37 48
Timber 9 12 7
Farming and other types 6 4 3
Total 100% 100% 100%
N = 141 136 163
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income than parcels bought before 1973. The following table demon-
strates another commitment to farming: after 1973, these new pur-
chasers were more likely to maintain their land as farms than before.
TABLE 12
PERCENTAGE OF 100-ACRE WORKING FARMS THAT
CONTINUED TO BE FARMED BY DATE OF
ACQUISITION
Date of Acquisition
Whether or Not Farmed 1968- 1971- May 1973-
After Acquisition 1970 April 1973 1978
Yes 62% 66% 79%
No 38 34 21
Total 100% 100% 100%
N = 54 55 84
We hesitate to speculate on the role of the land gains tax in stimu-
lating farming. Certainly if the tax deterred investors, more land be-
came available for people who otherwise could not locate property to
farm. In addition, if investors derive more income from their land
purchases than do people who buy to farm, it is not surprising that
more persons with incomes under $10,000 entered the land market
after 1973.
We must keep one point in mind when analyzing the impact of the
land gains tax on increased purchases of land for farm use. The land
gains tax ordinarily will not deter people who buy property for their
own use because these purchasers presumably will hold the land for a
longer time. Thus, the tax may not have deterred farmers from de-
manding large parcels. If the tax deterred investors, however, it may
have removed some purchasers who competed with farmers for agri-
cultural land. Other cultural or value factors, however, may also
have influenced the market for Vermont farms.
Parcel division or addition is another type of environmentally sig-
nificant land use decision. We analyzed what owners did to the size
of their parcels after purchasing them. They could alter the lot two
ways: they could create small parcels of land by filing a subdivision
plan, or they could enlarge their holding by purchasing adjacent
property. The following tables reveal that the number of subdivision
plans that large parcel purchasers said they filed over the periods
studied did not change. We caution that the filing rate must be dra-
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matically larger to be statistically significant. In contrast, the rate of
acquisition of adjacent properties noticeably increased.
TABLE 14
WHETHER OR NOT SUB-DIVISIONS PLAN FILED FOR
100-ACRE PARCEL BY DATE OF ACQUISITION
Parcel Purchaser Said
Sub-division Plan Filed
Yes
No
Total
N =
Date of Acquisition
1968- 1971- May 1973-
1970 April 1973 1978
8% 10% 9%
92 90 91
100% 100% 100%
141 136 163
TABLE 15
WHETHER OR NOT PROPERTY ADJACENT TO 100-ACRE
PARCEL ACQUIRED BY DATE OF ACQUISITION
Date of Acquisition
Acquired Additional 1968- 1971- May 1973-
Adjacent Property 1970 April 1973 1978
Yes 9% 9% 19%
No 91 91 81
Total 100% 100% 100%
N = 141 136 163
A question that is separate from changes in lot size is how owners
may have developed their property. The fact that recently purchased
properties were already developed at the time of transfer made it dif-
ficult to analyze the extent of new development. One possible indica-
tion of development is if the owner built two or more houses on the
land. The rates of such development were so low in our survey that
we could not identify a statistically reliable trend.
To summarize, we now have evidence that after 1973, some inves-
tors withdrew from the Vermont land market, while Vermont resi-
dents increased their holdings.8" These findings suggest that
speculation in the Vermont land market decreased after Vermont en-
acted the land gains tax. The important question is whether the land
80. See table I 1 supra.
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gains tax caused these changes. We conclude that the tax played
some role in stimulating a withdrawal of certain investors.
In our interviews with purchasers, we asked several questions to
learn why they made their land acquisitions and use decisions. These
inquiries assisted us as we tried to isolate the land gains tax as a fac-
tor in the plans of purchasers. Clearly, the land gains tax most af-
fected the buying decisions of investors and subdividers.8 The
evidence also suggest that the major impact of the tax on affected
investors was causing them to stop buying Vermont land.82 A variety
of survey questions demonstrate the salience of the land gains tax on
their decisions.
To begin our study of the effect of the tax on investment decisions,
we investigated the respondent's knowledge of the law. To measure
their understanding, we asked four questions about the tax:
1) What is the minimum tax rate?
2) Whether the tax applied to gains realized on buildings and
land or applied only to gains realized on the land itself?
3) What is the period of time after the date of purchase for which
the land gains tax is still in effect?
4) Whether the buyer's plans for use of the land affects the land
gains tax to be paid by the seller?
First, we asked the respondents if they were generally familiar with
the terms of the land gains tax. Almost one-fifth of the total sample
of 100-plus acre parcel purchasers knew nothing about its terms. Sig-
nificantly, the two primary targets of the law-investors and subdi-
TABLE 16
REPORTED FAMILIARITY WITH TERMS OF LAND GAINS
TAX BY DATE OF ACQUISITION
Date of Acquisition
Familiarity with Terms 1968- 1971- May 1973-
of Land Gains Tax 1970 April 1972 1978
Yes 75% 83% 81%
No 25 17 19
Total 100% 100% 100%
N = 141 136 163
81. See table 22 infra.
82. See table 25 infra.
[Vol. 22:3
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol22/iss1/1
TAXING SPECULATIVE LAND GAINS
viders-claimed that they knew more about the tax then did
residential buyers.
TABLE 17
REPORTED FAMILIARITY WITH TERMS OF LAND GAINS
TAX BY PLANS FOR 100-ACRE PARCELS; AND
FOR SUBDIVIDERS
For Sample of Purchasers of 100-Acre Parcels For Sub
by Plans for Such Parcels Sam
divider
ple
Familiarity with
Terms of Land
Gains Tax
Yes
No
Total
N
Investment
90%
10
100%
145
Year-Round or
Seasonal Living
74%
26
100%
203
After isolating the respondents who said they knew about the law,
we asked specific questions about the tax. This sample of purchasers
was most familiar with the six-year holding period for tax liability,
and the provision that allocates taxable gain to land while exempting
gain realized on structures built on the property. Less than half of
the sample, however, correctly answered these questions. Few re-
spondents understood that the buyer's plans for the land can affect
the seller's tax liability. We also noted that respondents who had
TABLE 18
PERCENTAGE OF THOSE REPORTING FAMILIARITY WITH THE
LAND GAINS TAX GIVING CORRECT ANSWERS
REGARDING TERMS OF LAND GAINS TAX
BY SAMPLE TYPE
Item
Maximum Land Gains Tax Rate (60 percent)
Land or Building Gains Taxed? (Land only)
Holding Period Until No Tax (6 years)
Buyers Plans Affect Gains Tax (If Principal
Residence, No Tax)
Sample Type
100-Acre
Purchasers Subdividers
(1968-1977) (1970-1977)
16% 32%
441 149
To Use But
Not To Live
On
81%
19
100%
67
86%
14
100%
149
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filed for a subdivision permit were considerably more familiar with
relevant tax terms than were the cross-section of purchasers.
We sought to further refine our analysis of respondent's knowledge
by indexing the number of correct answers. Less than ten percent of
the total sample gave four correct answers, and more than forty per-
cent either answered all questions incorrectly or lacked any knowl-
edge of the tax.
TABLE 19
NUMBER OF CORRECT ANSWERS ABOUT LAND GAINS
TAX BY PLANS FOR 100-ACRE PARCELS; AND
FOR SUBDIVIDERS
For Sample of Purchasers of 100-Acre For Subdivider
Parcels by Plans for such Parcels Sample
Number of Correct
Answers About Year Round or To Use But
Land Gains Tax Investment Seasonal Living Not Live On
None (or not
familiar with tax) 27% 59% 38% 25%
One to three 59 40 61 58
Four 13 1 1 17
Total 100% 100% 100% 100%
N 145 203 67 149
When we add the forty percent who answered all questions incor-
rectly to the twenty percent in the total sample who knew nothing
about the tax, we find that sixty percent of major land purchasers
gave no correct answers. This is not surprising because many farmers
and homebuyers in the sample do not need to consider the tax in
their plans. The table does show that investors and subdividers,
whose behavior the tax seeks to regulate, knew more about the law
than the sample in general. We conclude from this survey of pur-
chaser familiarity with the law that those whom the tax influenced
were more likely to adjust their land holding periods. They were less
inclined to change the planned use of their property to minimize the
impact of the land gains tax on their investments.
We then sought to understand whether the land gains tax actually
had an effect, and if so, how much of an effect, on purchase decisions.
The tax is one of many considerations for a potential buyer, and we
developed two methodologies to gauge specifically the salience of the
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law. First, we asked respondents open-ended questions about factors
they considered in their purchase plans. Second, we asked them di-
rect questions on their perception of the importance of the land gains
tax. We were not surprised that these two approaches yielded differ-
ent results of the significance of any one factor.
In the initial part of the survey, which examined respondents' plans
and actual uses of specific parcels selected for survey, only investors
and subdividers said the land gains tax was a consideration in chang-
ing their decisions. It was only a minor factor, too.
TABLE 20
WHETHER OR NOT LAND GAINS TAX MENTIONED AS A
REASON FOR CHANGE IN PLANS FOR SELECTED PARCEL
BY PLANS FOR 100-ACRE PARCEL; AND FOR
SUBDIVIDERS
For Sample of Purchasers of 100-Acre For Subdivider
Parcels by Plans for such Parcels Sample
Land Gains Tax
Mentioned as
Reason for
Changed Plans
Yes
**No
Total
N
Year Round or To Use But
Investment Seasonal Living Not Live On
6 * *
94 100 100
100% 100% 100%
145 203 67
TABLE 21
WHETHER OR NOT LAND GAINS TAX MENTIONED AS A
REASON FOR A CHANGE IN PLANS.FOR SELECTED
PARCEL BY DATE OF ACQUISITION
100-Plus Acre Purchasers by Date of
Acquisition
Land Gains Tax
Mentioned As
Reason for
Changed Plans
Yes
No
Total
N
Less than half of 1 percent.
1968
1
100
100%
141
1971
5
95
100%
136
3
97
100%
149
1973
1
99
100%
163
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Note that only purchasers in the second period bought land before
Vermont passed the land gains tax, but still had a short enough hold-
ing period to be influenced by the tax. Thus, the patterns of sponta-
neous open responses about the salience of the land gains tax were
not surprising. The impact of the tax on the plans of all purchasers
between 1968 and 1978 was, however, minimal.
Then we asked direct questions about the impact of the land gains
tax on decisions. Approximately twenty percent of the respondents
said the land gains tax affected their plans for the particular parcel
TABLE 22
REPORTED INFLUENCE OF VERMONT LAND GAINS TAX ON
PLANS FOR BUYING SELLING OR DEVELOPING SELECTED
PARCEL BY PLANNED USE OF LAND; AND FOR
SUBDIVIDERS
For Sample of Purchasers of 100-Acre For Subdivider
Parcels by Plans for such Parcels Sample
Plans for Parcel
Influenced by
Tax
Yes
No
Total
N
Investment
27%
73
100%
145
Year Round or
Seasonal Living
7%
93
100%
203
To Use But
Not Live On
9%
91
100%
67
20%
80
100%
149
* Includes those who said they were not at all familiar with tax.
selected for the survey, and almost thirty percent said the tax affected
their plans for buying, selling or developing other Vermont property.
The key finding was that those whom the Vermont legislature
wanted to regulate through the land gains tax most often said the tax
affected their plans. Similarly, a significant percentage of subdividers
and investors said the tax affected their plans for other parcels in
Vermont.
The responses by the date of purchase are also useful. We note
that almost ninety percent of the land purchasers prior to 1970 still
own Vermont land; nearly eighty percent of the land buyers since
1973 have also owned other Vermont parcels. Thus, the groups over-
lap. Those who owned multiple major parcels of land were, to an
extent, classified by chance on which parcel we selected to study. In
(Vol, 22:3
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol22/iss1/1
TAXING SPECULATIVE LAND GAINS
the first part of our analysis above, however, we saw that the charac-
ter of purchasers of 100-plus acre parcels appeared to have changed
since 1973. Although the differences are modest, recent purchasers
appear less likely to say the land gains tax affected their plans for
other parcels of Vermont land than were purchasers of land at an
earlier period.
TABLE 23
REPORTED INFLUENCE OF LAND GAINS TAx ON PLANS FOR
BUYING, SELLING OR DEVELOPING OTHER LAND IN
VERMONT BY PLANNED USE OF LAND; AND FOR
SUBDIVIDERS
For Sample of Purchasers of 100-Acre For Subdivider
Parcels by Plans for such Parcels Sample
Influence of Tax
on Plans for
Other Parcels Year Round or To Use But
Reported Investment Seasonal Living Not Live On
Yes 39% 13% 18% 33%
No* 61 87 82 67
Total 100% 100% 100% 100%
N 145 203 67 149
* Includes those who said they were not at all familiar with terms of tax.
It is difficult to use social science measurement to produce absolute
measures. Thus, it may be impossible to precisely determine the sali-
ence of the land gains tax in land decisions. The tax was rarely a
major factor in significant changes in plans for parcels already
purchased, but a substantial minority of major purchasers and subdi-
TABLE 24
REPORTED INFLUENCE OF LAND GAINS TAx ON PLANS OF
100-PLUS ACRE PURCHASERS FOR BUYING, SELLING OR
DEVELOPING OTHER LAND IN VERMONT BY DATE
OF ACQUISITION
Date of Acquisition
Influence of 1968- 1970- May 1973-
Tax Reported 1970 April 1973 1978
Yes 26% 23% 15%
No 74 77 77
Total 100% 100% 100%
N 141 136 163
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viders said that it influenced their decisions for future land purchases.
Perhaps most important, a very clear pattern emerged of purchasers
who were most likely to perceive an impact of the land gains tax.
Those who purchased to invest and subdivide were significantly more
likely to report an impact of the tax than purchasers for personal use.
This pattern is important for two reasons. First, the Vermont legisla-
ture intended the tax to discourage land speculation without seriously
hurting those who wanted to buy land for their own purposes and to
live on. Generally speaking, Vermont appears to have achieved this
goal. Second, those purchasing land for investment purposes, partic-
ularly non-residents, may have been less active in the land market in
Vermont since 1973. The admission of Vermont investors that the
land gains tax was relatively important in their plans is consistent
with the hypothesis that the land gains tax played a role in this
correlation.
Having determined that the land gains tax did affect land buying
decisions, our crucial question is what kind of effect did it have? Did
it deter the speculation and subdivision that Vermont believed was
harming its land? When questioned about the influence of the tax on
their plans for other parcels in Vermont, most respondents said that
because of the law, they decided not to buy land they would have
otherwise purchased. A significant percentage also said the law
caused them to hold the property longer. Once again, the two groups
Att
He
IncDic
TABLE 25
THE WAY LAND GAINS TAX SAID TO HAVE AFFECTED PLANS
FOR BUYING, SELLING OR DEVELOPING OTHER
VERMONT LAND BY PLANNED USE OF LAND; AND
FOR SUBDIVIDERS
For Sample of Purchasers of 100-Acre For Subdivider
Parcels by Plans for such Parcels Sample
ect of Land Year Round or To Use But
Gains Tax Investment Seasonal Living Not Live On
Id Longer 8% 4% 8% 5%
creased Price 1 * *I
d not buv 15 3 6 13
Other
Not Ascertained
No Effect
Total
N
14
58
100%
145
4
86
100%
203
5
81
100%
67
5
10
66
100%
149
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that the land gains tax most affected-investors and subdividers-
most often refrained from buying.
Finally, we asked respondents who owned land for at least five
years prior to the interview if they had changed the size of their hold-
ings. While the responses generally were evenly split, they differed
markedly depending on the planned use of the property. Investors
and subdividers were likely to own substantially less land than
before. Those who purchased for their own use increased their hold-
ings as often as they decreased them.
TABLE 26
AMOUNT OF VERMONT OWNED Now AND FIVE YEARS AGO
COMPARED BY OWNERS OF ANY VERMONT LAND FIVE
YEARS AGO BY PLANNED USE OF LAND; AND FOR
SUBDIVIDERS
Plans for 100-Acre Parcels
Vermont Land
Owned Now
and Five Years Year Round or To Use But
Ago Compared Investment Seasonal Living Not Live On Subdividers
More Now 26% 30% 30% 24%
Same 31 48 36 23
More Five Years
Ago 44 22 35 53
Total 100% 100% 100% 100%
N 119 181 50 122
Respondents offered a variety of reasons for reducing their hold-
ings. The land gains tax and land regulations were one answer, but
no particular reason stood out. We may, however, conclude that sub-
dividers and investment-oriented land purchasers have decreased
their investment in Vermont land more so than have other kinds of
purchasers.
Conclusion of Survey Analysis
Our most important task in this conclusion is to use the above sur-
vey data to put the land gains tax in perspective. We may state with
confidence two general conclusions. First, the land gains tax has
only minimally influenced purchasers of large parcels of Vermont
land in the past ten years in what they did with the parcel they
bought, though it may have caused them to hold it longer in some
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cases. The majority of these people were unfamiliar with the details
of the tax and how it works. Second, while we do not overstate the
salience of the tax in land market behavior, the data does reveal that
the tax was a factor in some purchase decisions. We have identified
significant changes in the characteristics of land buyers, the kind of
land they purchased, and the reasons they had for buying in Vermont
since 1973. These changes confirm that some major investors in Ver-
mont land have left the market. A small but significant minority of
investors conceded that they stopped buying other Vermont property
because of the land gains tax.
Space considerations required omitting much evidence in the full
report that leads us to hesitate to draw here a specific conclusion
about the importance of the land gains tax compared to other factors
that might enter into one's land market decision. We find it difficult,
however, to conclude from the data other than that the land gains tax
played a part in recent changes in the Vermont land market. It has
discouraged some subset of would-be investors from investing in Ver-
mont land.
2. Has the Land Gains Tax Affected Prices in the Vermont
Land Market?
The second perceived regulatory consequence of decreased land
speculation is a lessening of the rapid escalation of land prices. The
research did demonstrate that the gains tax has deterred speculation
in the Vermont land market, but was unable to isolate the resulting
effect on prices. Our descriptive analysis revealed only that the land
gains tax has played some part in stabilizing the market for Vermont
land during a recession. Open land prices, however, even within a
single community, varied to the extent that further, manageable anal-
ysis of land prices proved unreliable and misleading. Although we
could not draw reliable conclusions on the impact of the gains tax on
land prices, we believe it beneficial to explain our research methodol-
ogy. By describing what we did, and considered doing, we hope to
assist future researchers in this area and help them to avoid some of
the problems inherent in this type of study.
The strength of our study lies in its integration of several research
methodologies. These included interviews with key Vermont market
observers, surveys of land market participants, and statistical com-
parisons of open land prices in pairs of towns in Vermont and New
Hampshire. This integrated approach alerted us to problems we
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otherwise would have ignored in a simple statistical analysis of land
price data.
We began with the basic research assumption that we could isolate
the effect of the land gains tax on Vermont land prices by (1) model-
ing price determinants common to all land markets, and (2) control-
ling for variables unique to the Vermont land market. We then
proceeded with two alternative approaches. First, we compared open
land sales in 10 key Vermont towns before and after enactment of the
tax. Second, we compared sales of that Vermont land with transac-
tions in comparable towns in New Hampshire. In the first approach,
we hoped to conclude whether the land gains tax accounted for any
changes in prices not otherwise explained by existing or other new
price factors in the market. In the second procedure, by studying
comparable land on the Vermont-New Hampshire border subject to
the same regional and national influences, use regulations, and local
levies except for the land gains tax, we hoped similarly to conclude
whether the gains tax accounted for price differences. We would
have been even more certain of our findings if both the time series
and interstate analysis showed the same impacts. Unfortunately, our
inability to accurately model the Vermont land market to our satis-
faction meant that we could not isolate the effect of the land gains tax
on price in either case. Simply stated, the price per acre of equal-
sized open land parcels in our comparable Vermont and New-Hamp-
shire towns varied so greatly that it masked any general price trends,
much less price differences, attributable to the land gains tax.
We conclude from these price variations that Vermont does not
have a land market characterized by informed buyers and sellers with
similar values and expectations. Traditional economic theory cannot
accurately account for the basic workings in such a market. Lacking
such knowledge, even the most sophisticated statistical analysis
would be misleading and its results unfounded.
V. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES INVOLVED IN THE ENACTMENT OF A
FEDERAL OR STATE LAND GAINS TAX
Introduction
Federal and state governments do not have unlimited power to tax.
The federal government has powers only to the extent provided ei-
ther explicitly or by implication in the Constitution. Other constitu-
tional provisions may also limit Congress in its specific exercise of the
taxing power. By contrast, state governments have plenary power to
1981]
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tax but are subject to federal or state constitutional limits. This por-
tion of the article examines how these issues concerning the limits on
the taxing power might influence the enactment of a land gains tax at
the national or state level. Specifically, the first section analyzes
whether the federal government has the power to enact a national
land gains tax, either as a tax or as a regulatory measure. Since fed-
eral and state tax law overlap somewhat, this discussion of federal
law provides some background for a similar analysis of state constitu-
tional law. The second section examines the constitutional limits on
legislative power such as protections against unfair burdens, arbitrary
classifications, and undue burdens on non-residents or interstate
commerce. The last section analyzes the extent to which provisions
of individual state constitutions may limit the enactment of a state
land gains tax involving graduated rates dependent upon profit, hold-
ing period, and type of property sold.
A. The Scope of Federal Power to Tax the Short-Term Sale or
Exchange of Land
Congressional power to tax is not unlimited. The Supreme Court
historically has interpreted the Constitution as recognizing two types
of taxes: "direct" and "indirect".8 3 Until the passage of the sixteenth
amendment, the Supreme Court required apportionment of direct
federal taxes among the states by population and uniformity of indi-
rect taxes throughout the country." The sixteenth amendment ex-
empted "income" taxes from the apportionment requirement on
"direct" taxes. s5
These limitations pose the following problems for a legislature con-
templating the enactment of a national land gains tax: what type of
tax would it be and what constitutional requirement must the tax
meet?
1. Direct Taxes and Income Taxes
The political difficulty of apportioning a direct tax based on popu-
83. See Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 557 (1895), citing
The License Tax Cases 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 462, 471 (1866).
84. See, e.g., Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895).
85. The amendment reads: "The Congress shall have power to lay and collect
taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the
several states, and without regard to any census or enumeration." U.S. CONST.
amend. XVI.
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lation has encouraged Congress to fashion "indirect" taxes. Until
1895, the Supreme Court generally upheld federal taxing measures8 6
because it narrowly defined direct taxes as "confined to taxes levied
directly on real estate because of its ownership."87 Then in Pollock v.
Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. ,88 the Supreme Court departed from this
doctrine by holding that a tax on income from property was the
equivalent of a tax on the property itself. Accordingly, the Court in-
validated a non-apportioned tax on income derived from real and
other property on the grounds that the tax was "direct."89 Standing
alone, Pollock raises the possibility that the Supreme Court might
construe a national land gains tax as a direct tax, requiring appor-
tionment, because it taxes the gain a land owner derives from the sale
of real property.
Post-Pollock developments, however, make such a construction
highly unlikely. First, the sixteenth amendment nullified the holding
in Pollock in 1913. To avoid problems of characterizing income by
source as a means of determining whether it is "direct" or "indirect",
the sixteenth amendment validates a tax on income "from whatever
source derived."9 Second, even before the ratification of the six-
teenth amendment, the Supreme Court had begun to back away from
categorizing federal taxes as direct.9 Finally, one might not catego-
rize a national land gains tax as a tax on income, but as a levy on the
sale or exchange of land, with gain derived constituting a measure
rather than the subject of a tax. Under this approach, Congress
would impose a national land gains tax on an incident of land owner-
86. See, e.g., Springer v. United States, 102 U.S. 586 (1880) (tax on certain in-
come); Scholey v. Rew, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 331 (1874) (succession of property); Veazie
Bank v. Fenno, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 533 (1869) (state bank notes); Pacific Ins. Co. v.
Soule, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 433 (1868) (insurance company business); and Hylton v.
United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171 (1796) (carriages).
87. Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 240 U.S. 1, 19 (1915).
88. 157 U.S. 429 (1895).
89. Id. at 583.
90. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
91. See, e.g., Bromley v. McCaughn, 280 U.S. 124 (1929) (federal gift tax); New
York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345 (1921) (tax on transfer of net estate of dece-
dents); Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107 (1911) (excise tax on business done in
corporate form); Spreckels Sugar Refining Co. v. McClain, 192 U.S. 397 (1904) (tax
on business of refining sugar measured by gross annual receipts); and Knowlton v.
Moore, 178 U.S. 41 (1900) (inheritance tax). The Court contined to attack the origin
test as late as 1939. See Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466 (1939)
(upholding power of state to tax income of instrumentality of the United States).
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ship rather than on property.92 Consequently, it seems highly un-
likely that a national land gains tax would constitute a "direct" tax
requiring Congress to satisfy the constitutional mandate of appor-
tionment. If the Supreme Court were to interpret the tax as direct, it
would probably construe it as an income tax, exempt from the appor-
tionment requirement as provided in the sixteenth amendment.
2. Indirect Taxation and Uniformity
If a national land gains tax would not qualify as a direct tax, it
would constitute an indirect tax subject to the constitutional mandate
of uniformity. Taxable land sales are unlikely to be equally distrib-
uted throughout the country. Nevertheless, Supreme Court decisions
construing other tax measures suggest that a national land gains tax
would probably still meet the uniformity requirement. The Court
has historically upheld excise taxes, a species of indirect taxation, that
Congress has not necessarily applied on a uniform geographic ba-
sis." For example, the Court's treatment of uniformity saved a cor-
porate tax that was an excise on the privilege of doing business.
While states do not have uniform requirements for incorporation, the
Court reasoned that the Constitution "does not require the equal ap-
plication of the tax to all persons or corporations who may come
within its operation. ... " I Thus, inequality of application owing
to different local conditions did not invalidate the excise. Thus, a
national land gains tax would probably meet the uniformity require-
ments of an "indirect" tax.
3. Will a Regulatory Objective in a National Land Gains Tax Put
it Beyond the Reach of the Taxing Power?
The Supreme Court's expansive interpretation of the Commerce
92. The Supreme Court articulated this theory when it upheld the federal gift tax
in Bromley v. McCaughn, 280 U.S. 124 (1929) (tax imposed upon particular use of
property, incidental to ownership, is an excise that need not be apportioned).
93. For example, in Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41 (1900), the Court rejected a
challenge to the federal inheritance tax. The tax rate varied based on the legatee's
relationship to the deceased, and the amount of the legacy. Opponents also argued
that the tax was not geographically uniform because testamentary and intestacy laws
differed among states. But the Court said, "[w]hat the Constitution commands is the
imposition of the tax by the rule of geographical uniformity, not that in order to levy
such a tax objects must be selected which exist uniformly in the several States." Id. at
108.
94. Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107, 158 (1911).
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power has largely rendered this a moot question at the federal level.
Nevertheless, similar problems might arise at the local level; for ex-
ample, a local government might have a limited taxation power but
no power to regulate certain conduct either because of affirmative
preemption or lack of specific enabling authority from the state.
Consequently, it is worth looking briefly at the federal experience.
Some older federal cases found certain taxes beyond the scope of
the taxing power because the behavior modification was not inherent
in the design of the tax, but instead arose because the tax was an
enforcement mechanism for specific standards external to the tax. In
such instances the older cases were likely to find the tax a penalty
requiring independent regulatory authorization. For example, in Bai-
ley v. Drexel Furniture Company,95 the Supreme Court struck down
an excise tax whose obligation arose out of an employer's knowing
non-compliance with federal regulations regarding the use of child
labor because four years earlier the Court had decided that Congress
lacked the power to regulate such use of child labor. While this case
does not currently represent federal law, its distinction between a reg-
ulatory tax and a tax regulation is instructive:
Does this law impose a tax with only that incidental restraint
and regulation which a tax must inevitably involve? Or does it
regulate by the use of the so-called tax as a penalty? . . . Taxes
are occasionally imposed on the discretion of the legislature on
proper subjects with the primary motive of obtaining revenue
from them and with the incidental motive of discouraging them
by making their continuance onerous. They do not lose their
character as taxes because of the incidental motive. But there
comes a time in the extension of the penalizing feature of the so-
called tax when it loses its character as such and becomes a mere
penalty with the characteristics of regulation and punishment.96
For similar reasons, the Court invalidated other taxes depending
upon non-compliance with federal regulations.97
The Supreme Court later retreated from its narrow reading of the
95. 259 U.S. 20 (1922).
96. Id. at 36, 38.
97. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (struck down tax imposed by
Congress that provided a 90% credit to producers obeying price-fixing and labor pro-
visions of the act); United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287 (1935) (invalidated
federal tax on liquor dealers not operating in compliance with state law); and Hill v.
Wallace, 259 U.S. 44 (1922) (invalidated tax for non-compliance with federal regula-
tions on the operation of grain boards of trade).
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taxing power.98 In 1950, the Court said that the regulatory aim might
even be dominant rather than secondary to the revenue raising
purpose:
It is beyond serious question that a tax does not cease to be valid
merely because it regulates, discourages, or even definitely deters
the activities taxed. . . . The principle applies even though the
revenue obtained is obviously negligible. . . or the revenue pur-
pose of the tax may be secondary. . . [n]or does the tax statute
necessarily fall because it touches on activities which Congress
might not otherwise regulate. As was pointed out in Magnano
Co. v. Hamilton, 292 U.S. 40, 47 (1934) [upholding a severe state
tax on butter substitutes]: 'From the beginning of our govern-
ment, the courts have sustained taxes although imposed with the
collateral intent of effecting ulterior ends which, considered
apart, were beyond the constitutional power of the lawmakers to
realize by the legislation directly addressed to their
accomplishment.'99
Although it is not decisive as to the federal issues, the Vermont
Supreme Court echoed this sentiment when it upheld the Vermont
land gains tax. It declared that the legislature had the authority to
achieve particular social and economic objectives by imposing a tax
in a particular manner, even if the objective might be deemed beyond
the legislature's other powers. °°
The converse issue of whether a tax is a regulation in disguise is
whether a regulation with tax characteristics is a valid regulation.
Here the Supreme Court decisions give Congress broad discretion as
to how it achieves a regulatory objective.'' Consequently, even if
98. See United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22 (1953) (upholding federal tax on
persons engaged in accepting wagers); and Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506
(1937) (upholding license tax on firearms dealers).
99. United States v. Sanchez, 340 U.S. 42, 44-45 (1950).
100. Andrews v. Lathrop, 132 Vt. 256, 261, 315 A.2d 860, 863 (1974).
101. In Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381 (1940), the Court
upheld a price-fixing arrangement designed to stabilize the coal industry and elimi-
nate unfair competition. The scheme included a 19 % sales tax on bituminous coal
that non-participating producers sold. The Court said:
Clearly this tax is not designed merely for revenue purposes. In purpose and
effect it is primarily a sanction to enforce regulatory provisions of the Act. But
that does not mean that the statute is invalid and that the tax unenforceable.
Congress may impose penalties in aid of the exercise of any of its enumerated
powers. The power of taxation, granted to Congress by the Constitution, may be
utilized as a sanction for the exercise of another power which is granted it ....
It is so utilized here.
Id. at 393.
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the Supreme Court were to construe a national land gains tax as a
tax-like regulation rather than a regulatory tax, it would be valid so
long as Congress can constitutionally regulate the sale or exchange of
land. Under the Commerce Clause,'0 Congress has the power to
regulate almost any intrastate activity having an effect on interstate
commerce, even if the activity is only relevant in its cumulative im-
pact together with other activity.' 3 It therefore appears that congres-
sional power under the Commerce Clause to enact a national land
gains tax would only require judicial determinations that such a tax
was a reasonable means to effect the regulatory end, and that Con-
gress could rationally find that the conduct deterred would affect in-
terstate commerce. 104
B. Limits on Federal and State Power
In addition to the requirement that a national land gains tax fall
within the scope of congressional power, it also must not violate any
limitation contained in the Bill of Rights or subsequent constitutional
amendments. States considering a land gains tax must also consider
the same limitations. Generally, these provisions protect citizens
from federal or state government actions that impose unfair burdens,
create arbitrary distinctions, or unduly limit access to the benefits
flowing from a unified national political and economic system.
1. Unfair Burdens
The fifth amendment' 015 and the Due Process Clause of the four-
teenth amendment' °6 protect citizens against undue burdens in the
102. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
103. See, Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971) (upholding conviction for
illegal loan sharking, despite activity taking place in state, and lack of evidence that
defendant was connected to organized crime or had ever used instrumentalities of
commerce in interstate extortion); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (up-
holding application of Civil Rights Act against small restaurant despite only link to
interstate commerce being acquisition of meat); and Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111
(1942) (upholding federal statute regulating wheat grown for home consumption be-
cause it affected supply available for interstate commerce and demand for the prod-
uct). See also South Terminal Corp. v. EPA, 504 F.2d 646 (1st Cir. 1974) (upholding
federal authority to control automobile pollution through rules resembling local zon-
ing ordinances).
104. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
105. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
106. Id. amend XIV.
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form of a "taking" of private property without just compensation by
federal or state governments. The Supreme Court has suggested that
"rare and special instances" may exist where a taxing statute is "so
arbitrary as to compel the conclusion that it does not involve an exer-
tion of the taxing power, but constitutes, in substance and effect, the
direct exertion of a different and forbidden power, as, for example,
the confiscation of property." 7 The Court, however, has never re-
lied upon this theory to invalidate a tax.
The Vermont land gains tax maximum rate of sixty percent proba-
bly does not constitute an unfair burden. While the Vermont tax rate
is high, it is not unprecedented. Until the taxable year beginning af-
ter December 31, 1981, the federal short-term capital gain rate was
seventy percent.1 08 The housing speculation tax enacted in Washing-
ton, D.C. contains rates as high as ninety-seven percent. 0 9 Further-
more, a landowner can avoid or minimize the tax altogether by
waiting through the holding period. Even if a landowner pays the
full sixty percent, he still realizes a portion of the gain. Conse-
quently, it seems unlikely that even the application of the sixty per-
cent rate would constitute forbidden "confiscation.""10
2. Protection Against Arbitrary Distinctions
The Constitution does not have explicit language analogous to the
fourteenth amendment restriction on state denial of equal protection
of the laws. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has applied equal pro-
tection concepts to federal laws through the Due Process clause of the
107. A. Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, 292 U.S. 40, 44 (1934) (sustaining state excise
tax of 15€ per pound on all butter substitutes sold within the state, despite tax being so
excessive that it destroyed a particular business). In City of Pittsburgh v. Alco Park-
ing Corp., 417 U.S. 369 (1974), the Court examined a 20% gross receipts tax on the
city's private parking garages. These facilities also competed with a public parking
authority that charged lower rates. The Court declined to hold that government com-
petition was sufficient to invalidate the tax as an unconstitutional "taking" of prop-
erty, nor did it further define a "rare and special instance."
108. I.R.C. § l(a) (West Supp. 1980). Congress subsequently lowered the maxi-
mum rate to 50%. Id., as amended by Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L.
No. 97-34, 59 Stat. 172.
109. D.C. CODE ANN. § 47-3305 (Supp. 1980).
110. As a result of the Vermont Supreme Court's interpretation of the land gains
tax rate schedule, even the 60% rate is now applicable only on a portion of the taxable
gain. See note 37 supra. For a further discussion of the "taking" issue, see Baker,
Controlling Land Uses and Prices by Using Special Gain Taxation to Intervene in the
Land Market: The Vermont Experiment, 4 ENvr'L AFF. 427 (1975).
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fifth amendment."' Thus, the following discussion treats both the
federal and state governments as similarly limited by equal protec-
tion concepts.
Equal protection under both federal and state laws requires protec-
tion against arbitrary exercises of legislative power. Since most laws
involve some kind of classification (as does the land gains tax), courts
must determine which classifications are permissible and which are
unconstitutional. The scope of judicial review of the constitutionality
of the classification depends upon the nature of the classification it-
self. In general, a classification that impinges upon a "fundamental
right" or involves a "suspect class" will trigger a stringent require-
ment that the classification be linked to a "compelling state interest".
As a practical matter few laws can survive this test. Other classifica-
tions are valid if they rationally relate to a legitimate state interest.
A land gains tax would probably withstand equal protection chal-
lenges. It is difficult to argue that its regulatory classifications would
impinge upon a "fundamental right" or involve a suspect class.' 12
Consequently the tax would only have to meet the more relaxed stan-
dard of judicial review-whether the classification involved is ration-
ally related to a legitimate state interest. 13  Moreover, if courts
classify a land gains tax as a tax rather than a regulatory measure, the
tax might face an even less strict standard of review.' 14 While not
dispositive of other jurisdictions, the Vermont Supreme Court re-
jected an equal protection challenge to the tax by holding that the
classification based upon holding period bore a rational relationship
111. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). See also Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1 (1976). The Supreme Court has not examined a federal tax law on the basis of
equal protection rationale, but for the opinion of one federal court of appeals, see
Moritz v. Commissioner, 469 F.2d 466 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 906
(1973) (invalidating statutory denial to single man of deduction for dependent care
expenses available to others because the classification was based on sex and lacked a
fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation).
112. The Supreme Court has not held that access to adequate housing is such a
right. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972).
113. See City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976) (city ordinance ad-
versely affecting vendors in an historic district, who had sold for less than eight years,
is valid under the rational relation test).
114. The Supreme Court usually gives considerable deference to state tax classifi-
cations. See, e.g., Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974) (upholding state statute per-
mitting $500 annual exemption from property tax for widows, but not widowers); and
Lehhausen v. Lakeshore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356 (1973) rehearing denied, 411
U.S. 910 (1973) (upholding state constitutional provision subjecting corporations and
similar entities but not individuals to personal property tax).
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to one of the purposes of the tax-the deterrence of speculation." t5
3. Limits Arising from a Unified National and Political
Economic System
A state land gains tax must meet federal constitutional limitations
on state power growing out of the nature of a federal system. Specifi-
cally, a state may not unfairly discriminate against individuals who
are not citizens of the state or against activities constituting interstate
commerce. The two areas are fundamentally related, but can be
functionally divided according to whether the party adversely af-
fected is an individual or an enterprise.
a. Protection for Individuals: the Privileges and Immunities of
Citizenship, Including the Right to Travel
The fourteenth amendment" 6 protects citizens of the United States
from state abridgement of the privileges and immunities of their na-
tional citizenship. This clause has provided a basis for judicial inval-
idation of laws that seemed aimed at non-residents without
substantial justification for the distinction. A state land gains tax
should withstand a constitutional challenge based upon the privilege
and immunities clause.
Land speculation in Vermont is an activity undertaken by both res-
idents and non-residents of Vermont. Consequently, a tax on land
speculationper se, such as the Vermont land gains tax, draws no dis-
tinction between individuals who live in Vermont and those who do
not. The one provision of the statute that might be subject to ques-
tion is the primary homesite exemption." 7
As a threshold matter, it is not certain this provision would trigger
a privileges and immunities analysis. The distinction relates to the
use of the land, rather than the citizenship of the seller or buyer.
115. The court rejected the claim of landowners that the tax violated equal protec-
tion guarantees because it arbitrarily taxes land held less than six years. Andrews v.
Lathrop, 132 Vt. 256, 260, 315 A.2d 860, 864 (1974). The court quoted Justice
Holmes' dissent in Louisville Gas and Elec. Co. v. Coleman, 277 U.S. 32 (1928),
when he stated "the decision of the legislature must be accepted unless we can say
that it is very wide of any reasonable mark." Id. at 41 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 4n-
drews did not address the tax exemption on gain allocable to structures or small pri-
mary residential lots. These classifications, however, also are arguably constitutional
because they are rationally related to the purpose of deterring land speculation.
116. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
117. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 10002(b) (1973).
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Some citizens of Vermont may be unable to take advantage of the
exemption because the land they are selling is not the site of their
primary residence. Moreover, some citizens of other states may be
able to sell primary residential homesites to Vermont citizens, thus
taking advantage of the exemption.
Nonetheless, the scope of the primary residential homesite exemp-
tion has evolved to almost completely remove the burden of the tax
from existing or prospective citizens whose only land transaction is
likely to be their apparent or anticipated home. A court might there-
fore hold this exemption to be the equivalent of a distinction based
on citizenship. But if the exemption did trigger a privileges and im-
munities scrutiny, it would probably still be valid. First, the burden
upon non-residents is slight. The tax only affects short-term sales of
land; all other sales, and gain allocable to structures, are ex-
empt." 9 Second, this burden is probably offset by a sufficient state
118. In contrast, the Supreme Court has invalidated a New Hampshire commuter
tax that discriminated against non-residents. A non-resident paid a $250 tax, while
residents earning the same income paid only $10. Austin v. New Hampshire, 420
U.S. 656 (1975).
Three years later, the Court upheld a system of hunting license fees that resulted in
a non-resident paying more than seven times the fee that a resident paid. The court
said residency distinctions are not necessarily unconstitutional. Prohibited distinc-
tions "hinder the formation, the purpose, or the development of a single union of
(individual) states. Only with respect to those 'privileges' and 'immunities' bearing
upon the vitality of the Nation as a single entity must the State treat all citizens,
resident and non-resident, equally." Baldwin v. Fish and Game Comm'n, 436 U.S.
371 (1978). See also Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518 (1978) (invalidating Alaskan law
giving hiring preference to qualified Alaskan residents over equally qualified, non-
residents for jobs on the Alaska pipeline). It is difficult to reconcile these decisions,
except to argue that access to elk is a less important "privilege" than access to employ-
ment. See generally, L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1979).
Courts will also consider the reason for the law, as well as the type of interest it
affects. Non-residents are also subject to discrimination if they constitute a "particu-
lar source of the evil by which the statute is aimed." Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385,
398 (1948) (striking down a Louisiana statute distinguishing between residents and
non-residents for fishing licenses). There must, however, still be a "reasonable rela-
tionship between the danger represented by non-citizens, as a class, and the severe
discrimination practiced upon them" Id., at 399.
119. Significantly, the Court in Baldwin v. Fish and Game Comm'n, 436 U.S.
371, 383 (1978), cited Blake v. McClung, 172 U.S. 239 (1898), to hold that the privi-
leges and immunities clause prevents states from imposing unreasonable burdens on
aliens" in the ownership and disposition of property held in the State. (Emphasis
supplied). Blake invalidated a Tennessee statute giving resident creditors of a bank-
rupt Tennessee corporation preference over non-resident creditors. Vermont's land
gains on non-residents is a lighter burden than was the situation in Blake.
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interest in the passage of the law. 120
Another possible argument is that the primary residential homesite
exemption violates a constitutionally protected "right to travel" be-
cause a buyer must establish a primary residence in order to receive
the benefit of the land gains tax exemption upon resale within the
taxable six year period. 21 In addition, the land gains tax is easily
distinguishable from these cases, which involved indigents. By con-
trast, the tax falls on individuals who are wealthy enough to own
land. Also, by inducing Vermont purchasers to reside primarily in
Vermont rather than to live elsewhere, the land gains tax is hardly a
vehicle for Vermont to close its borders to undesired immigration. In
addition, recent cases indicate a reluctance to overturn a statute on
"right to travel" grounds.22
b. Protection for Interstate Commerce
While not an automatic conclusion, it appears safe to assume that a
land gains tax could be subject to judicial scrutiny under a commerce
clause analysis. The United States Supreme Court has articulated
two tests depending upon whether the particular law is a regulation
or a tax. Since the land gains tax has mixed characteristics12 3, both
tests will be examined.
120. As the Vermont Supreme Court noted in upholding the land gains tax:
[W]e may take judicial notice of an increasing concern within the State over the
use and development of land as a natural resource, a concern to which the legis-
lature has responded in other instances with appropriate legislation [Act 250]
... .Speculation falls within the ambit of such concern as a land use; indeed it
has a bearing on many other uses to which the land might be put.
Andrews v. Lathrop, 132 Vt. 256, 261-62, 315 A.2d 860, 863 (1974).
121. The Supreme Court addressed this argument in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
U.S. 618 (1969). Shapiro invalidated a residency requirement for state welfare
eligibility.
122. See McCarthy v. Philadelphia Civil Serv. Comm'n, 424 U.S. 645 (1976) (up-
holding residency requirements for municipal employment); Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S.
393 (1975) (divorce). See also Steel Hill Dev. Co., Inc. v. Town of Sanborton, 469
F.2d 956 (Ist Cir. 1972) (upholding large lot zoning ordinance against challenge as
exclusionary, in part on grounds that second home ownership was entitled to a lower
order of judicial protection than primary home ownership).
123. The Vermont Supreme Court has held the tax has two purposes: deterring
land speculation, and raising revenue. Andrews v. Lathrop, 132 Vt. 256, 315 A.2d 860
(1974).
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1.) Regulation
For regulatory action, the Court focuses on the legitimacy of the
local purpose and the degree of burden imposed on commerce. 2 4 In
analyzing a regulatory state law, a threshold question is whether it
would be viewed as "basically a protectionist measure, or whether it
can fairly be viewed as a law directed to legitimate local concerns,
with effects upon interstate commerce that are only incidental." '125
Restrictions upon either the flow of commerce into or out of a state
are vulnerable if a state:
...has overtly moved to slow or freeze the flow of commerce
for protectionist reasons. It does not matter that the State has
shut the article of commerce inside the State in one case and
outside the State in the other. What is crucial is the attempt by
one State to isolate itself from a problem common to many by
erecting a barrier against the movement of interstate trade 26
Is a land gains tax subject to a challenge as protectionist? The Ver-
mont Supreme Court found that the regulatory purpose of the land
gains tax was the deterrence of land speculation and its assumed un-
desirable land use consequences. 127 A land gains tax may discourage
out-of-state investors, but it also discourages local ones and does not
seem aimed at protecting a favored local real estate industry.1 28
124. See generally Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (forbid-
ding state from requiring local company to package its goods within the state).
125. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978). The Court
overturned New Jersey's ban on importation of waste originating outside its territorial
limits. The Court said the prohibition was an exclusionary, protectionist measure,
because it imposed on those outside the state the entire burden of slowing the flow of
refuse into New Jersey's remaining landfill sites. The Court also noted opposite situa-
tions--where the commerce clause barred states from giving their own inhabitants a
preferred right of access to natural resources over non-residents. See also Penn-
sylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923) (invalidating law granting preference
to local consumers of natural gas produced within the state); and West v. Kansas
Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229 (1911) (invalidating state statute designed to prohibit
transportation of gas produced in Oklahoma beyond the state).
But the Court recently upheld a coal severance tax despite arguments that it unduly
burdened interstate commerce. See Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 101 S.
Ct. 2946 (1981). Apparently such a tax on exploitation of natural resources does not
cross the protectionist threshold, but is a valid means of preserving the environment.
A land gains tax, viewed as a conservation rather than a protectionist measure, would
likely survive commerce clause scrutiny.
126. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 628 (1978).
127. Andrews v. Lathrop, 132 Vt. 256, 315 A.2d 860 (1974).
128. Cf. Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1935) (invalidated state's
refusal to license milk dealer who obtained milk out-of-state at a price fixed below
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Moreover, the Court will also examine the burden imposed on
commerce, striking down those burdens that seem unduly excessive
in relation to the local benefit.' 29 With the Vermont land gains tax,
however, the ability of land owners to wait out the tax holding period
mitigates the burden. Furthermore, the Vermont land gains tax,
while imposing a burden on some interstate commerce, also imposes
a similar burden on local commerce in land. Thus the burden on
interstate commerce appears too slight to produce a viable challenge
on a regulatory test.
2.) Revenue Measures and Interstate Commerce
In contrast to judicial inquiry of regulatory action, the land gains
tax undergoes scrutiny as a revenue raising device by analysis of its
effect. Specifically, the Supreme Court has recently suggested testing
a statute by whether "the activity is not sufficiently connected to the
State to justify a tax, or that the tax is not fairly related to the benefits
provided the taxpayer, or that the tax discriminates against interstate
commerce, or that the tax is not fairly apportioned. ' q30
Even if the activity is wholly interstate, however, direct taxation of
interstate commerce is permissible so long as the "forbidden effects"
do not appear. 13 1
Clearly a land gains tax relating only to the sale or exchange of
land within that state is "sufficiently connected to the State to justify
a tax." ' 32 Moreover, the land gains tax would be fairly related to the
benefits provided the taxpayer.' 33 Since real property is an asset for
which a state provides particularly local benefits and protection, a tax
on its transfer should not be vulnerable.
States must apportion their taxation so that they only tax that por-
that for instate dealers; Court held state was trying to protect local suppliers from
foreign competition).
129. See Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960) (up-
holding legitimate state environmental control laws on ship smoke pollution); Proctor
& Gamble Co. v. City of Chicago, 509 F.2d 69 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 421 U.S.
978 (1975) (city ordinance banning sale of phosphate detergents does not interfere
with interstate commerce).
130. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 287 (1977).
131. Dep't of Revenue of Wash. v. Ass'n of Wash. Stevedoring Cos., 435 U.S. 734
(1978).
132. Complete Auto Transit v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 287 (1977).
133. Standard Pressed Steel Co. v. Dep't of Revenue of Wash., 419 U.S. 560, 562
(1975), citing Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444 (1960).
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tion of interstate commerce that is fairly related to the taxing jurisdic-
tion. The rationale behind this apportionment requirement is to
avoid the risk of multiple taxation that could produce a burden on
interstate commerce that is not imposed upon local commerce. 134 In
contrast to the usual taxes challenged under an apportionment test, a
land gains tax would subject the seller at most to two taxes--one by
Vermont where the land sale occurred and the other by the state of
the seller's domicile under an income tax theory. Since Vermont also
imposes an income tax on its citizens, residents and non-residents are
treated with relative equality.
Occasionally, the Court has struck down measures whose wording
is not explicitly discriminatory on the grounds that the measure in
fact taxes interstate activity without imposing a similar burden on
local enterprise. 135 In those cases, the court's primary concern is the
effect such a tax has on the non-resident enterprise since the only
means for the non-local activity to conduct its business is to pay the
required fee, while residents conducting similar enterprises have
other means of carrying on their business. The land gains tax, how-
ever, is a different revenue measure. Local sellers of Vermont land
have no easy alternative to sale not available to non-residents. Their
only advantage is the principal residential homesite exemption which
is also unavailable to many Vermont residents who own vacation
homesites or large parcels of Vermont land not used as a residence at
all. Thus, while not automatically exempt from scrutiny, the burdens
the land gains tax imposes on interstate commerce do not seem suffi-
cient to raise the prospect of a successful constitutional challenge.
C. State Constitutional Limits on the Taxing Power
State governments, unlike the federal government, have plenary
powers to tax. Almost all state constitutions, however, contain a pro-
vision requiring selected taxes to be "uniform" or "proportional"."16
These uniformity provisions pose a problem for jurisdictions consid-
134. See generally Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250 (1938).
135. See, e.g., Nippert v. City of Richmond, 327 U.S. 416 (1946) (striking a tax on
business solicitation); Robbins v. Shelby Co. Taxing Dist., 120 U.S. 489 (1887) (inval-
idating a licensing fee on agents soliciting business for non-resident enterprises).
136. For an analysis of these constitutional provisions, see W. NEWHOUSE, CON-
STITUTIONAL UNIFORMITY AND EQUALITY IN STATE TAXATION (1959). See also M.
BERNARD, CONSTITUTIONS, TAXATION, AND LAND POLICY (1979).
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ering a land gains tax because a gains tax (1) applies to gain from
land alone; (2) is progressively more severe as profits increase; and
(3) has a tax rate that varies according to the length of the holding
term. The issues for analysis are twofold: (1) is the land gains tax
likely to be classified as one that must meet the equality and uniform-
ity provisions and (2) if so, can it still pass constitutional muster?
Rather than analyzing the taxing provisions of fifty states in detail,
this section merely attempts to highlight how states might resolve
these questions.
Most states permit graduated income taxes.137 Since a land gains
tax shares many of the uniformity problems of a graduated income
tax, it is almost certain that these states would permit a land gains
tax.
The validity of a state land gains tax becomes less certain among
those states that do not permit graduated income taxes. 138 The sur-
vival of a land gains tax in these state requires that the tax be classi-
fied as an excise tax, and that the state allow excise taxes to have
graduated rates.139 Massachusetts may serve as a test case for the
137. Without judging whether a particular state would classify a land gains tax as
an income tax, our analysis discloses that 36 states levy graduated income taxes:
Alabama Alaska Arizona
Arkansas California Colorado
Delaware Georgia Hawaii
Idaho Iowa Kansas
Kentucky Louisiana Maryland
Minnesota Mississippi Missouri
Montana Nebraska New Jersey
New Mexico New York North Carolina
North Dakota Ohio Oregon
Rhode Island South Carolina Utah
Vermont Virginia West Virginia
Wisconsin
Three states would probably permit graduated income tax, even though they have
not acted. They are Connecticut, Indiana, and South Dakota. Three states may per-
mit graduated income taxes. They are Nevada, Texas and Wyoming.
138. Seven states appear not to permit graduated income taxes at all. They are
Florida, Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Hampshire, Tennessee, and
Washington.
139. Many states permit reasonable graduation of rate when an excise tax is in-
volved. For example, in holding that a graduated excise tax on oil was valid, the
United State Supreme Court said "[t]he State is not limited to ad valorem taxation. It
may impose specific taxes upon different trades and professions and may vary the rate
of excise upon various products." Ohio Oil Co. v. Conway, 281 U.S. 146, 159 (1930).
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type of problems faced in these states.
In order for a land gains tax to survive uniformity challenges in
Massachusetts, it has to fall outside both the property tax and the
income tax classifications" 4 into the third remaining classification:
excise taxation. While a land gains tax may have constituted a prop-
erty tax at one time in Massachusetts,'41 recent Massachusetts cases
suggest that the tax currently falls outside a property tax classifica-
tion.1 42 Massachusetts law is extremely unclear on whether a tax on
the gain derived from real estate could constitute income.143 Oppo-
nents of the income classification would argue that gain derived from
real estate can be used as the measure of an excise tax, rather than as
the subject of an income tax. Under this theory, a land gains tax is
imposed upon the exercise of the right of property transfer, rather
than on gain derived."4 If so, then the tax only has to be "reason-
While state constitutional provisions may vary, in general the only restriction on state
graduated excise taxes is that they not be arbitrary or unreasonable. Id.
140. Article 44 of the Massachusetts Constitution requires that an income tax be
levied at uniform rates throughout the Commonwealth. MAss. CONST. art. 44. Thus,
Massachusetts taxes earned income at one rate and unearned income at another rate.
Both rates, however, are uniform for that class of income and are not dependent, as in
federal income tax law, on the total amounts received.
141. See State Tax Comm'n v. Fine, 356 Mass. 51, 247 N.E.2d 701 (1969) (divi-
dends paid to a Massachusetts beneficiary by a foreign trust on foreign land were not
taxable in Massachusetts under the then state income tax). In Fine, the court focused
on the origin rather than the destination of the income involved and explained that
the income at issue was a property tax in the sense that it was a tax on the underlying
estate.
142. See Ingraham v. State Tax Comm'n, 368 Mass. 242, 331 N.E.2d 795 (1975).
In Ingraham, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court apparently abandoned the
origin test and focused instead on the destination of the income. The court explicitly
declined, however, to determine whether a tax on income remained a property tax as
well as an income tax, or whether the tax was an excise tax for state purposes. Id. at
248, 331 N.E.2d at 798.
143. The actual language of Article 44 of the Amendments to the Massachusetts
Constitution distinguishes an income tax from an excise tax. Nevertheless, the lan-
guage may have been based on the possibly discredited perception that an income tax
was a form of property tax. See notes 88-92 and accompanying text supra.
144. See, e.g., Bromley v. McCaughn, 280 U.S. 124, 136-37 (1929) (an excise tax is
"laid only upon the exercise of a single one of those powers incident to ownership");
Atlantic Lumber Co. v. Commissioner of Corps. and Taxation, 292 Mass. 51, 197
N.E. 525 (1935), aft'd, 298 U.S. 553 (1936) (tax on privilege of business activity mea-
sured in part by net income upheld as valid excise tax); Minot v. Winthrop, 162 Mass.
113, 38 N.E. 512 (1894) (deathtime succession tax upheld as valid excise tax even
though measured on the basis of amount of property).
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able" without the requirements of proportionality or the prescription
against being graduated.
Similar analysis must be taken in other jurisdictions based on their
particular constitutional provisions. Aside from states that appear to
allow graduated income taxes (and thus a land gains tax), the follow-
ing states appear to have relatively liberal rules on excise taxes: Flor-
ida, Illinois, Tennesee, Texas, Wyoming, and Washington (though in
Washington a land gains tax might be classified as a property tax).
Michigan, Nevada, and New Hampshire impose restrictions on their
excise taxes. Pennsylvania does not appear to allow a graduated tax
of any kind.
CONCLUSION
The Vermont land gains tax is remarkable because it is the first
domestic attempt to use a tax disincentive in the land market to con-
trol land use and price. Except for the problem of allocating gain
between buildings and land, the tax has benefits. It only applies to
realized gain, and it is relatively easy to compute. Moreover, the stat-
ute does not tax gain derived from long-term sales or loss
transactions.
The land gains tax, however, has many of the drawbacks of taxes
in general. It preserves environmental quality only to the extent that
it discourages particularly undesirable purchasers from investing in
Vermont land. The Vermont development community consistently
argued that the tax unnecessarily burdened the land market in view
of the state's existing successful land use regulations. Supporters
countered that the tax would supplement those regulations by con-
trolling second homesite and other development.
Jurisdictions lacking Vermont's direct land use regulation may
look to a land gains tax as a comprehensive deterrent to uncontrolled
land speculation. Those states should carefully consider whether a
tax alone is the most appropriate means to achieve the desired end.
The tax has no environmental favorites. Conversely, a state with reg-
ulatory controls similar to Vermont's might consider tying a land
gains tax exemption directly to compliance with its land use controls.
We could not conclusively answer some questions that would pro-
vide observers of the land gains tax with more insight into the law. In
particular, we could not determine the effect of the land gains tax on
land prices. In fact, the intense field survey persuades us that
econometric analysis of land prices is useful only if accompanied by
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thorough background investigations of the local market environment
and its participants. We do feel, however, that we have significantly
extended the methodology for determining the law's impact beyond
an analysis of personal interviews with key local officials. For exam-
pie, we have demonstrated the utility of a sophisticated survey that
reveals to concerned legislators the impact of the tax on land market
participants. The survey also produced unexpected results, such as
the apparent link of the land gains tax to the increase in the propor-
tion of land purchasers after 1973 who used their new property as
working farms.
Thus, we focused on the land gains tax in a general study of eco-
nomic disincentives as an environmental control. We hope, however,
that this study will also provide insights into methodologies for deter-
mining the impact of law.
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